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I. BACKGROUND
The Constitution gave Congress the power to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective
Writings and Discoveries.”1  So fundamental was the idea that the law
of the nascent nation should provide a reward for and thereby
encourage innovation that James Madison wrote, in urging
ratification, that “[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be
questioned . . . [t]he public good fully coincides in both cases with
the claims of individuals.”2  Indeed, little beyond this statement is
reported in the early record of the ratification process—a testament
to the lack of controversy over the provision.  The Patent Act of 1790
was one of the earliest measures passed by the First Congress and
signed into law by President Washington.3  Abraham Lincoln is
credited with saying:  “The patent system . . . added the fuel of
interest to the fire of genius.”4
In giving effect to the intent of the Framers and the early Congress,
courts and litigants soon grappled with a problem still vexing them
today, two hundred years later: how broadly should the inventor’s
patent claim be permitted to reach?  On the one hand, if the patent
is narrowly construed to the embodiment of the invention
constructed and described in the patent, stealing the benefit of the
invention becomes an easy matter for a copyist, who avoids the literal
reach of the patent claim through slight alterations.5  The incentive
to innovate intended by the patent system is thus lost.  On the other
hand, if the patent claim is construed more broadly than the “fair”
scope of the invention, would-be competitors who might make
innovative improvements to the original invention could be deterred
                                                          
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
3. The Patent Act 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
4. The quotation is inscribed on the building that now houses the United States
Department of Commerce in Washington D.C., which also housed the U.S. Patent
Office until it moved to its current location in Arlington, Virginia, in the 1960s; see
also GREGORY L. LAVORGNA, AN OVERVIEW OF THE US PATENT SYSTEM, A.L.I—A.B.A.
COURSE OF STUDY: FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE (1994) (noting that
Lincoln, in addition to being widely credited with the quote, was probably the only
American President to have his own patent—U.S. Patent No. 6,469—a “system for
buoying vessels over shoals”).
5. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 12 (2d ed. 1991)
(stating that “[t]o hold a patentee to the precise claim language in all cases could
turn the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”).
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by the need to pay tribute to the original patent holder, possibly
conferring on the patent holder an unjustified monopoly position.6
As patent infringement cases percolated through the courts over the
last two centuries, two competing legal doctrines emerged to balance
the interests of patent owners and would-be competitors:  the
“doctrine of equivalents”7 and the countervailing doctrine of
“prosecution history estoppel.”8
The struggle to resolve the basic tension between these doctrines
and the policy concerns that underlie them is perhaps no better
illustrated than by the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.9
In Festo, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit10 struggled with
the uncertainty inherent in attempting to draw fair boundaries
around a patentee’s rights.11  As will be discussed later, the Federal
Circuit in Festo tipped the balance squarely in favor of the would-be
competitor and against the original innovator.12  In favoring the
would-be competitor, the Court of Appeals used the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel to severely cabin the doctrine of
equivalents, setting up a regime in which the original inventor has
little control of close imitations of the original invention.13
                                                          
6. See id. at 199-202 (stating that representations made to the Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) during patent prosecution, which clarify or limit the
product or process being patented, can have the effect of barring a patentee’s
subsequent infringement claims by limiting the patentee’s ability to pursue
infringement beyond the scope of the initial patent grant).
7. See discussion infra Parts III, V (explaining the doctrine of equivalents).
8. See discussion infra Parts IV, VI-VII (explaining the development and
application of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel).
9. 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. _,
122 S. Ct. 1831 (May 28, 2002) (No. 00-1543).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (creating the Federal Circuit
via the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982).  The court itself has stated that the
“central purpose” of that Act was “to reduce the widespread lack of  uniformity and
uncertainty of legal doctrine that exists in the administration of patent law.”  Panduit
Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 465, 470
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23).
11. Festo, 234 F.3d at 563-64, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
12. See id. at 582, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883 (limiting a patentee’s ability to
claim infringement under the doctrine of equivalents by strictly construing “claim
amendments” as changes made to the scope of the patent during prosecution for a
variety of reasons and not just those required by PTO in order to grant the patent).
13. See id. at 566-78, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870-80 (limiting the doctrine of
equivalents by holding that:  (1) amendments narrowing the scope of the patent for
any statutorily related reason gives rise to a defense of prosecution history estoppel;
(2) “voluntary” claim amendments are equally as narrowly construed; (3) once
prosecution history estoppel is created, no “range of equivalents” is available for the
amended claim elements; and (4) “unexplained” amendments are similarly not
entitled to any range of equivalents).
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The Supreme Court, in vacating the Federal Circuit’s decision,
brought things back into balance and closer to historic norm.14
Indeed, a look back in time to the significant patent cases over more
than two hundred years of history shows that the issues addressed in
Festo—the relationship between the doctrine of equivalents and the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel—were hardly new.15  To the
contrary, the Supreme Court had fleshed out these fundamental
patent law issues by the 1880s.16  What was new about Festo was the
Federal Circuit’s marked departure from the majority view taken by
the Supreme Court throughout most of this history.17  The Supreme
Court, by correcting the imbalance left by the Federal Circuit, may
have preserved the checks and balances in the patent system, and
thus kept it relevant in the midst of another period of rapid
technological development.  Whether that is the ultimate result will
depend upon how the courts, most importantly the Federal Circuit,
apply the Supreme  Court’s guidance in future cases.
II. THE PRE-CIVIL WAR ERA: RECOGNITION THAT THE PATENT CLAIM
EXTENDS TO EQUIVALENTS OF THE ORIGINAL INVENTION
A study of how courts have dealt with the balance between the
rights of the patent holder and would-be competitors—also referred
to in many cases as “the public”—takes one back only a few decades
shy of the founding of the United States.  In some of the nation’s
earliest reported patent infringement cases, the notion that a patent
holder’s claim extends beyond both the invention’s literal
embodiment and that described in the patent to cover equivalent
alterations first appeared to be as uncontroversial as the idea of the
patent system itself.  The “Nail Wars” cases of the early 1800s illustrate
this assumption.
In 1798, Jacob Perkins invented a machine combining a lever,
cutter and vice that cut and headed a nail from a rod of iron.18  But
                                                          
14. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1831.
15. See Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1880)
(setting forth in the notion of prosecution history estoppel—then called “file
wrapper estoppel”—in a case involving a process for manufacturing false teeth); see
also Autogiro v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400-01, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 705
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (stating that “the doctrine of equivalents is subservient to . . .
[prosecution history] estoppel.”).
16. See generally Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to
Determine Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and other Emerging Technologies, 18
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 3-23  (1992) (discussing the development of the
doctrine of equitable equivalents and prosecution history estoppel in the late 1880s
in relation to technology advancement).
17. See discussion infra Part IX.
18. Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718) (Washington,
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Perkins’ machine tended to jam when operated rapidly and
apparently was not as commercially successful as a similar device
invented in 1807 by Jesse Read.19  Read’s improved device, which also
consisted of the same basic elements—a vice, a cutter and a lever—
was reported to operate much more efficiently than Perkins’ device.20
Apparently, the major difference between the two devices was that
with Perkins’ machine, the lower jaw was fixed and the upper jaw was
movable, whereas with Read’s machine, the upper jaw was fixed and
the lower jaw was movable.21
The ensuing litigation resulted in two decisions, one from the
Circuit Court of Massachusetts and one from the Circuit Court in
Pennsylvania.  In the first decision, Odiorne v. Winkley,22 Supreme
Court Justice Story, riding circuit, presided over a jury trial in which
the issues of infringement and validity of Read’s patent were tried.23
The jury found for the defendant and, under Justice Story’s
instructions, must have concluded that the two machines were indeed
“constructed substantially upon the same principles and upon the
same mode of operation.”24
In the other reported case, Gray v. James,25 the assignee of the
Perkins patent asserted infringement by a user of Read’s machine.26
                                                          
C.J.) (describing in detail the nail making device).
19. Compare Gray, 10 F. Cas. 1015, with Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1814) (No. 10,430) (Story, Circuit Justice).  Note that the courts use “Read” or
“Reed” respectively.
20. See Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1016 (stating that because the machine could not make
more than 30-40 nails per minute without jamming, the Perkin’s device was
completely abandoned in favor of Reed’s machine that produced up to 200 nails per
minute).
21. Id.
22. 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,430) (Story, Circuit Justice).
23. See id. at 582 (containing Justice Story’s instructions to the jury relative to
functional equivalence).  Specifically, Justice Story instructed:
The first question for consideration is, whether the machines used by the
defendant [the Jacobs machines] are substantially, in their principles and
mode of operation, like the plaintiff’s machines.  If so, it was an
infringement of the plaintiff’s patent to use them, unless some of the other
matters offered in the defence are proved.  Mere colorable alterations of a
machine are not sufficient to protect the defendant.
Id.  Justice Story also instructed the jury on the issue of the validity of Read’s patent:
And, on the whole, in the present case, the question for the jury is, whether,
taking Reed’s machine, and Perkins’s machine together, and considering
them with their various combinations, they are machines constructed
substantially upon the same principles, and upon the same mode of
operation.  If they are, then Reed’s patent is void, and the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover . . . .
Id.
24. See id. at 582; see also supra note 23 (detailing the relevant portions of Justice
Story’s jury instructions).
25. 10 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718) (Washington, C. J.)
26. See id. at 1015 (charging that Read’s improvement was by “one [the same]
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Riding circuit in Pennsylvania, Justice Washington instructed the jury
in some detail on the defense that the Read machine was different in
form and principle from Perkins’ patented machine by focusing on
similarities in design, operation, and result.27
After acknowledging testimony by the defendant’s witnesses that
Read’s machine was an improvement over Perkins’, Justice
Washington explained that improvements alone, no matter how
substantial, do not provide a defense for patent infringement if the
underlying construction and operation of the machines are
substantially the same.28  The jury in Gray awarded a verdict for $750
to the plaintiff, which was trebled by the court.29
The law given to the juries in these early cases shows that the early
Patent Act protected inventors not only against infringement by
direct copies, but also against machines that were “colorable
alterations” operating in substantially the same manner and
obtaining the same results as the patented invention.30  Even if the
later machines improved upon the operation of the original, if those
machines operated on substantially the same principle, the original
inventor would nonetheless receive a reward for contributing to the
                                                          
operation,” and therefore infringed the patent).
27. See Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1016.  Justice Washington instructed the jury:
What constitutes a difference in principle between two machines, is
frequently a question of difficulty more especially if the difference in form is
considerable and the machinery complicated.  But we think it may safely be
laid down as a general rule, that where the machines are substantially the
same, and operate in the same manner, to produce the same result, they
must be in principle the same.  I say substantially, in order to exclude all
formal differences; and when I speak of the same result, I must be
understood as meaning the same kind of result though it may differ in
extent.
Id.
28. See id. at 1017.  The jury charge continued as follows:
If improvements only, what is the legal consequence?  Most clearly this and
no more: that Perkins and those claiming under his patent, have no right to
use those improvements without a license from the inventor.  But on the
other hand, neither Read nor any other person, can lawfully use the
discovery of Perkins of the principal machine without a license from him.
The law wisely and with justice, discriminates between, [and] rewards the
merit of each, by granting an exclusive property to each in his discovery, but
prevents either from invading the rights of the other.  If then, the jury
should be of opinion, that the two machines are the same in principle, it is
no defense for the defendants for using Perkins’ discovery, that they have
improved it, no matter to what extent.
Id.  Interestingly, the report of the Gray case makes no mention of the earlier
invalidation of the Read patent in the Odiorne case, which may not have actually
appeared in the case reports until later.
29. Id. at 1018.
30. See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,430)
(Story, C.J.) (containing Justice Story’s instructions that incorporation of such minor
alterations does not provide an adequate defense).
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technology.31
The Supreme Court eventually cemented this notion into the law.
One of the most celebrated, and perhaps one of the most important,
inventions of the pre-Civil War era was the electric telegraph.32
Samuel Morse is credited with the invention of the telegraph,
although other schemes for electric telegraphy were invented at
about the same time.  Morse’s electric telegraphy invention and those
electric telegraphy inventions of his competitors are described in
O’Reilly v. Morse,33 one of the most significant patent cases litigated up
to that time.34  After determining that Morse’s invention pre-dated
those of his competitors35 and invalidating one of the eight claims in
Morse’s patent for over-breadth,36 the Court turned to the question of
infringement by O’Reilly’s Columbia Telegraph Company.  O’Reilly’s
telegraph was not identical to Morse’s, but the Court noted that a:
well-settled principle of law, that the mere change in the form of
the machinery (unless a particular form is specified as the means
by which the effect described is produced) or an alteration in some
of its unessential parts; or in the use of known equivalent powers,
not varying essentially the machine, or its mode of operation or
organization, will not make the new machine a new invention.37
Such changes may constitute “improvements,” but, echoing the
decision in Gray, the users of the improved technology or devices
must seek the permission of the underlying patentee.38  To the
question “[d]oes [O’Reilly] use the same means?” the Court
answered: “Substantially, we think he does.”39  On this finding, the
                                                          
31. See, e.g., Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1017 (providing Justice Washington’s statement
that those benefiting from an improvement to the underlying machine must obtain
license to do so).
32. The telegraph has been described as “the Internet of the 19th Century”
because of its revolutionary effect on communications technology and commerce at
the time.  See generally TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE
STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY’S ON-LINE PIONEERS (1998).
33. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
34. See Benjamin Hattenbach, On Illuminating Black Holes in Patent Disclosures:
Toward a Structured Approach to Identifying Omitted Elements Under the Written Description
Requirement of Patent Law, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1195, 1200 n.21 (2001) (discussing the
“enablement requirement” of § 112 of the patent code and characterizing the
O’Reilly decision as “infamous”).
35. See Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 106-11 (containing Chief Justice Taney’s
opinion on the competing claims of Dr. Steinhil of Germany and Professors
Wheatstone and Davy).
36. See id. at 112-19 (explaining that Morse’s eighth patent claim seeking to
patent all modes of “electro-magnetic” transmission of “intelligible characters rights
or letters” were far too broad and use thus invalid).
37. Id. at 123.
38. Id.
39. See id. (finding that all of the “efficient elements” were the same or equivalent
and the organization of such elements essentially the same).
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Court affirmed the lower court’s finding of infringement.
Another, perhaps more significant, case in the development of
patent law, Winans v. Denmead,40 was handed down during the same
Term.  Ross Winans invented a revolutionary design for a
coal-carrying railroad car.41  Previously, the railroads shipped coal in
rectangular-shaped iron cars.  The weight of the coal required that
the iron sides of the cars be thick, thus increasing their weight, and
raising the power requirements of the locomotive.42  Winans’ coal car
was built in the shape of a cylinder, with the base tapering into the
frustrum of a cone, allowing the pressure of the load to be distributed
equally around the car’s circumference, and using the tensile
strength of the iron to bear much more of the load than in
rectilinear-shaped cars.  The advantages of this invention were
dramatic:  (1) a Winans-type car could carry twice as much coal as a
rectilinear car of the same weight;43 and (2) the conical shape
lowered the center of gravity of the load, providing stability and
allowing more convenient discharge.44
The defendants employed octagon-shaped coal cars with a
pyramidal-shaped base.45  The trial record included the testimony of
experts that the defendants’ car relied on the same principle as the
patented car and had the same advantages.46 In directing a verdict for
the defendants, the court below held that the patent was limited only
to the conical form of the invention as described in Winans’ patent.47
The Supreme Court was closely divided on the question of whether
limiting the patent to exactly the geometric form described was error.
Justice Curtis, writing for the majority, stated, “when a patentee
describes a machine . . . he is understood to intend to claim . . . not
only the precise forms he had described, but all other forms which
embody his invention . . . .”48  The Court then explained its rationale
in terms of a policy rewarding innovation—the patent right is not
                                                          
40. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
41. See id. at 331 (containing the claims of the patent under which the new coal
cars carry loads greater than their own weight).  Prior coal cars could not carry
heavier loads than their empty weight.  Id.
42. See id. at 332 (noting that the lighter weight of the cars increased available
locomotive power 50 to 100%).
43. See id. at 331 (stating that cars weighing 5,750 pounds could carry up to
18,550 pounds of coal—a 3.3 to 1.0 ratio).
44. See id. at 331, 339 (observing that part of the cone was lower than the axels).
45. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 339 (1853).
46. Id. at 346 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 336 (finding that the defendants’ design, described as “entirely
rectilinear,” was not an infringement).
48. See id. at 341 (stating further that it was a “familiar rule that, to copy the
principle or more of the operation described, is an infringement, although such
copy should be totally unlike the original in form or proportions”).
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“secure” if others are free to make substantial copies of the
invention.49
Four justices dissented, including, interestingly, Chief Justice
Taney.50  Writing for the dissent, Justice Campbell lamented the
uncertainty inherent in the majority’s rule and predicted dire results.
Winans’ description of his invention in terms of the circular form,
without an express reservation for equivalent structures “confine[d]
his claim to the use of the conical form, and exclude[d] from his
specification any allusion to any other.  He must have done so
advisedly.”51  How then, Justice Campbell asked, would a competitor
know the boundaries of the claim, and thus what activities he could
engage in without paying tribute to the original patent holder?52
“[T]his danger was foreseen, and provided for, in the patent act,”53
the dissent continued, by provisions requiring the patentee to
“describe his invention, in such full, clear, and exact terms, that from
the description, the invention may be constructed and used.”54  In the
dissenters’ view, “[f]ullness, clearness, exactness, preciseness, and
particularity, in the description of the invention, its principle, and of
the matter claimed to be invented,” would achieve the goals of
Congress and meet the demands of a growing nation.55  Relaxing this
standard to encompass the multitude of claims and devices entailed
in the majority’s interpretation would likely “be more mischievous,
more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant and
                                                          
49. See id. at 343 (explaining that the law does not require the patentee to
anticipate every form a copy might take).  Thus, the presumptive protection of the
law extends to all equivalent, although unstated, devices.  Id.  Earlier, the Court had
applied contract principles to the construction of patent claims by examining the
words of the written instrument and looking to the intent of the patent applicants to
resolve any ambiguities.  See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 454, 506 (1818).  The
Court stated that:
The construction of the patent must certainly depend on the words of the
instrument.  But where, as in this case, the words are ambiguous . . . . [t]he
intention of the parties, if that intention can be collected from sources which the
principles of law permit us to explore, are entitled to great consideration.
Id.
50. Chief Justice Taney wrote the Morse decision, wherein he stated it was “well-
settled that a mere change in the form of the machinery . . . or an alteration in some
of its unessential parts . . . will not justify its use without the consent of the first
patentee.”  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 123 (1853).
51. Winans, 56 U.S. at 346.
52. Id. at 347 (“The claim of today is, that an octagonal car is an infringement of
his patent.  Will this be the limit to that claim?  Who can tell the bounds within which
the mechanical industry of the country may freely exert itself?  What restraint does
this patent impose on this branch of mechanic art?”).
53. See id. (referring to the Patent Act of 1836 as modified by the Patent Act of
1840, which were the statutes then in effect).
54. Id.
55. Winans, 56 U.S. (1 How.) at 347.
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unjust pretensions and vexatious demands, [and] more injurious to
labor . . . .”56
Thus, even prior to the Civil War the Supreme Court grappled with
and definitively decided the central issue that divided the Federal
Circuit 150 years later in Festo.57  The Supreme Court determined that
guaranteeing the security of patent rights by prohibiting close copies
of the claimed invention, and thus preserving the Constitutional
incentive for technological innovation, should not be sacrificed even
for a rule that would provide more certainty to potential competitors
in the marketplace.58
The term “doctrine of equivalents” soon thereafter appeared as a
patent law term of art in McCormick v. Talcott.59  The Court defined
the limits of this doctrine by stating, “[t]he inventor of the first
improvement cannot invoke the doctrine of equivalents to suppress
all other improvements which are not mere colorable invasions of the
first.”60  The Court found no infringement in McCormick because the
defendant’s accused reaping machine was “substantially different,
both in form and in combination, from that claimed by the
complainant.”61  In the Civil War case of Burr v. Duryee,62 the Court
articulated the principle that “an infringement involves substantial
identity . . . [I]f the invention of the patentee be a machine, it will be
infringed by a machine that incorporates in its structure and
operation the substance of the invention.”63
In the ensuing years, the Court continued to develop certain
limitations and refinements to what might otherwise have been an
unfettered rule favoring patentees.  During this century of patent law
jurisprudence, the Court seems to have grown sensitive to the Winans
dissenters’ warning against allowing patents to “be very frequently
                                                          
56. Id.
57. See id. at 337-47 (addressing the question of  whether it is more appropriate
to make the patent right “secure” by allowing the patentee to control alternative
forms of his invention that nonetheless embody the essential principles of the
invention, or whether it is better to promote the interests of would-be competitors in
the “certainty” of knowing the boundaries of the patent claim).
58. See id. at 343 (“The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the
public are at liberty to make substantial copies of it.”).
59. 61 U.S. (1 How.) 402 (1857).
60. See id. at 405 (asserting that a patentee cannot “treat another as an infringer
who has improved the original machine by use of a different form or combination
performing the same functions”).
61. See McCormick, 61 U.S. (1 How.) at 408 (finding that it was “an independent
contrivance, a distinct invention”).
62. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531 (1863).
63. See Burr, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 572-73 (defining this as “an arrangement of
mechanism which performs the same service or produces the same effect in the same
way or substantially the same way”).
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employed to obstruct invention, and to deter from legitimate
operations of skill and ingenuity.”64  But the Court also did not lose
sight of the original purpose of the patent system—to secure to
inventors the legitimate fruits of their inventions, thereby
encouraging more innovation.
III. THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD: THE SUPREME COURT DEFINES
LIMITS TO CLAIMS OF EQUIVALENTS—THE “ALL ELEMENTS RULE”
The period following the Civil War represents one of the greatest
periods of innovation in our country’s history.65  Indeed, this period
marked the height of the Industrial Revolution.66  The 1880s alone
saw the invention or introduction of the incandescent lamp,67 the
trolley car,68 the automobile,69 the cash register,70 the electric
dynamo,71 the pneumatic tire,72 smokeless gunpowder,73 transparent
film,74 electrical welding,75 the electric furnace,76 as well as the steam
                                                          
64. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (1 How.) 330, 347 (1853) (Campbell, J.,
dissenting).
65. See generally 2 BERNARD BAILY ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 88-89 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing the tremendous number of
innovations during the post-Civil War period and the sharp increase in the total
number of patents issued).
66. Id. at 72.
67. See The Incandescent Lamp (noting experiments with incandescent light began
as early as 1812 and providing a brief description of how incandescent lamps
function), at http://library.thinkquest.org/2763/Electricity/History/Inventions/
LightBulb.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
68. See Laurence Gerckens, Ten Events that Shaped the 20th Century American City,
30 PLANNING COMMISSIONERS J. (stating the first successful use of the trolley was in
1886) (1998), available at http://www.plannersweb.com/wfiles/w151.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2002).
69. See THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA 215 (David Crystal ed., 1992) (noting the
automobile was invented in 1884).
70. See Cash Register (stating that James Ritty invented the cash register in 1884
and named the invention the “Incorruptible Cashier”), at http://www.inventors.
about.com/library/inventors/blcash_register.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
71. See Edison’s Timeline of Inventions, at http://www.americanhistory.si.edu/
timeline/05ed.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
72. See The Pneumatic Tube & The History of Pneumatic Devices (indicating that John
Boyd Dunlap patented his bicycle tire in 1888 and although this tire was not the first
pneumatic tire to be patented Dunlap’s tire was the first pneumatic tire to be
commercially accepted), at http://www.inventors.about.com/library/inventors/
blpneumatic.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
73. See Explosives (stating Paul Vieille invented smokeless gunpowder in 1885), at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/printablenew/04323.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
74. See Milestones—1878 to 1932 (noting that George Eastman invented  the first
commercially viable transparent film in 1889), at http://www.kodak.com/US/
en/corp/aboutKodak/kodakHistory/milestones78to32.shtml (last visited Jan. 26,
2002).
75. See Elihu Thomson Collection (stating Elihu Thomson invented the electrical
welding process in 1887) 1890-1974, at http://www.americanhistory.si.edu/archives
/d8103.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
76. See The Heroult ASM Historical Site Project (crediting Paul Heroult with the 1886
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turbine.77  Not surprisingly, the late 1800s was also an extraordinarily
active period for patent litigation78 and sorting out the respective
rights of the inventors and improvers fell to the courts.79  To address
the varied patent issues, the United States Supreme Court developed
common law rules that continue to guide the courts and the litigants
in present-day patent cases.
From the early patent decisions, the Court developed the principle
that “the mere change in the form of the machinery . . . or an
alteration in some of its unessential parts; or in the use of known
equivalent powers, not varying essentially the machine, or its mode of
operation or organization” requires the consent of the patentee.80
However, the establishment of this principle immediately raised the
question what elements are material or essential to a patent claim.81
Recognizing the elasticity permitted in answering this question is
central to understanding Chief Justice Taney’s seemingly opposed
views in Winans and O’Reilly.
In Winans, the dissent asserted that Winans’ patent should have
been regarded as falling within the narrow exception that held form
and substance as inseparable82 because the advantage of the invention
was its circular form.83  Accordingly, the circular form was a material
and essential element of the invention that had to duplicated in
order to find infringement.84  But how did Justice Taney determine
                                                          
invention of the electric furnace), at http://www.ggc-asmi.ucdavis. edu/heroult.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
77. See Important Historical Inventions and Inventors (stating that the steam turbine
was invented in 1884 by C.A. Parsons), at http://www.top-education.com
/tempscience1.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
78. Patent cases occupy a substantial portion of the official Supreme Court
reports from that era; more than 90 patent cases were decided by the Supreme Court
in the 1880’s alone. Interestingly, the consolidated appeals involving the controversy
over the patent rights to the telephone, in which Alexander Graham Bell was
ultimately victorious, occupy an entire volume of the United States reports. The
Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
79. See, e.g., Agawam Co. v. Jordon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 603 (1868) (holding an
employee’s suggested improvements are generally regarded as the property of the
party who originally discovered the principle and will be embodied in his patent for
the invention, unless the improvement amounts to a complete invention itself).  See
also Kreag v. Geen, 28 App. D.C. 437, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1906); E. Paper Bag Co. v.
Continental Paper Bag Co., 142 F. 479 (D. Maine 1905); Miller v. Nemmer, 179 F.2d
979 (C.C.P.A. 1950); Polaroid Corp. v. Horner, 197 F. Supp. 950 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
80. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 123 (1853) (emphasis added).
81. See Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 342-43 (stating that form alone is not
necessarily a material element to a patent claim).  But see id. at 344-45 (Campbell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing form is necessarily a material element).
82. See Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 343 (stating “[w]here form and substance
are inseparable,” the Court may find infringement based on form alone).
83. Id. at 345 (Campbell,  J., dissenting).
84. See id. (Campbell, J., dissenting) (asserting that because the patent
specifically referenced the form of the railroad cars, the specified form should not
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that the exact form specified in Winans’ patent was material?
Winans’ patent specified that the body of the railroad car should be
made “in the form of a frustrum of a cone, substantially as herein
described.”85  Yet Winans’ complaint, referring to the “principle of
operation,” stated “whereby the force exerted by the weight of the
load presses equally in all directions . . . so that every part resists its
equal proportion.”86  In O’Reilly, Morse appears to have made equally
broad claims.  However, Chief Justice Taney, in upholding the
infringement ruling, did not view that patent as limited only to the
form described in Morse’s specification.87
In the post-Civil War period, the Court revisited the issue of
material elements, with an eye toward balancing the concerns raised
by the justices in the majority and dissent in Winans.88  The Court’s
resolution established the framework for what would more than a
century later be called the “All Elements Rule.”89
In 1879, the Court began to develop this doctrine in Water-Meter Co.
v. Desper.90  The asserted patent was for an improved water meter with
a crankshaft.91  The defendant’s water meter functioned differently
from the patented meter because the defendant’s meter did not
possess a crank-shaft.92  Moreover, the Court concluded the
                                                          
have been held to be immaterial to the infringement claim).  This viewpoint gives
some insight into the meaning of the parenthetical phrase “(unless a particular form
is specified as the means by which the effect described is produced)” appearing in
Taney’s O’Reilly opinion.  See 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 123.  A decade earlier, in Prouty v.
Draper, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 340-41 (1842), Chief Justice Taney ruled that a patent
for a plow, which incorporated a new arrangement of previously known components,
was not infringed by the use of only a subset of the combination of components.
85. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 331.
86. Id. at 331.  This feature, along with the center of gravity-lowering feature of
the conical base, was what was duplicated by the accused octagonal car.  Id. at 340
(recounting testimony that showed the two different forms to be virtually identical in
their resistance to pressure and in the strengthening of the bottom of the railroad
cars).
87. See O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 85-86.  In fact, Chief Justice Taney, in an
oft-cited portion of his opinion, held Morse’s eighth claim invalid because Morse’s
claims were written so broadly that any machine or process sending signals for
communication purposes fell within the claims scope.  Id. at 112-17.
88. See, e.g., Water-Meter Co. v. Desper, 101 U.S. 332, 337 (1879) (stating that all
elements specified in a patent are material and the court can only determine if any
material elements are missing or whether a missing material element is supplied by
an alleged infringer).
89. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30
(1997); see also Glen P. Belvis, An Analysis of the En Banc Decision in Festo v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 11 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 59,
63 (2001-2002) (explaining that the all elements rule applies the doctrine of
equivalents to each individual element and not the invention as a whole).
90. 101 U.S. 332 (1879).
91. See id. at 334-35 (listing the combination of elements and most importantly
the crank-shaft that connected the rotary valve and pistons).
92. See id. at 335 (noting the defendant’s meter “has no crank-shaft, and no
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defendant’s employment of a direct connection between the valve
and the piston rods was not the equivalent of a crank-shaft.93
Accordingly, the Court found the defendant’s meter did not infringe
upon the patented meter because the defendant’s meter lacked one
material element, the crank-shaft, and substituted no equivalent
structure.94  The Court buttressed this holding by relying on what was
by then a statutory requirement for precise claiming.95  In subsequent
cases, the Supreme Court emphasized that elements were material
and essential, but nevertheless clearly contemplated that the
elements need not be identical.  Rather, if the equivalent elements
were substituted by the defendant, liability for infringement would be
found.96
In Gage v. Herring,97 the Court analyzed whether the alleged
infringer’s milling machinery contained each of the elements or
equivalents claimed in the patent.98  While some of the claim
elements were met by an equivalent structure that “performs the
same function in substantially the same way, and produces
substantially the same result” as the claimed invention, the
defendant’s structure did not contain any equivalent to the claimed
conveyor shaft.99  Quoting Justice Bradley’s decision in Water-Meter,
the Court dismissed the infringement complaint because all the
elements of the claimed invention were not present in an equivalent
                                                          
semblance of a crank-shaft, for imparting motion from the pistons to the rotary
valve . . . .”).
93. See id. at 336 (stating that the defendant achieved the same result without the
use of crank-shaft or a similar substitute).
94. Id. at 336-37.
95. See id. at 337 (stating that the Court can only decide if a material element of a
patent or its functional equivalent is present in a potentially infringing device,
however, the Court cannot declare an element specified in the patent as immaterial).
By this time, Congress has passed the Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, that
required that the inventor “shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part,
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.”  Patent
Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198.  The Supreme Court explained:
The growth of the patent system in the last quarter of a century in this
country has reached a stage in its progress where the variety and magnitude
of the interests involved require accuracy, precision, and care in the
preparation of all the papers on which the patent is founded.
Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876).  Therefore, the “distinct and formal
claim is . . . of primary importance in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is
patented . . . .”  Id. at 570.
96. See Gage v. Herring, 107 U.S. 647-48 (1883) (stating that because one of the
material elements of its functional equivalent was not duplicated by the defendant’s
milling machinery there was no infringement).
97. 107 U.S. 640 (1883).
98. See id. at 647-48 (discussing the material elements of the plaintiff’s milling
machinery specified in the patent and comparing those elements with the
defendant’s milling device).
99. Id. at 647-48.
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structure.100
Similarly, Fay v. Cordesman,101 decided the same year, cites
Water-Meter and Gage for what by then had become the well-settled
refinement of the rule established in O’Reilly and Winans.102  The
refined rule stated that when a patent is based on a claim for a
combination of elements and the patentee specifies certain elements
as being a part of that combination, each of those elements are
material to the patent.  Consequently, the only question for the court
to determine is whether an omitted part is supplied by its substantial
equivalent in the alleged infringing device.
The decision in Fay is especially significant because one of the
three patents sued upon was a reissued patent that contained claims
that had been amended in the Patent Office.103  The sawing apparatus
in the asserted patent was a reciprocating saw.  In obtaining the
reissue, the patentee, Richards, described, in an amended claim, an
anti-friction guide and adjustable guide in combination with the
upper portion of a saw blade.104  The defendant’s accused device was a
continuous band saw, which moved only in one direction, and
consequently, neither used the claimed guide or guard nor
substituted any equivalent structure.105  Although the Court found no
infringement, the Court’s explication of the law drew no distinction
between original claim and amended claim.106  The implication is that
infringement could have been found for the amended claim had
there been an equivalent of each of the elements of the claim.107
The Federal Circuit majority in Festo, interpreting the scope of
prosecution history estoppel, would later fail to appreciate the
significance of the fact that Fay involved a claim that had been
amended during prosecution in the Patent Office.108  Before turning
to Festo, however, the rich history of the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel contains much more to discuss.
                                                          
100. Gage, 107 U.S. at 648.
101. 109 U.S. 408 (1883).
102. Fay, 109 U.S. at 421.
103. Id. at 413-14 .
104. Id. at 412-13.
105. Id. at 414.
106. See id. at 420-21 (describing the doctrine of equivalents without making a
distinction between original and reissued patents).
107. See Fay, 109 U.S. at 420-21 (holding that a patent is infringed where,
substantial equivalents, meaning each of the material elements of a claim, or
combination of those elements, are used in the allegedly infringing device).
108. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 571,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865  (Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. _, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (May
28, 2002) (No. 00-1543) (asserting “absolute bar” rule is consistent with prior
precedent including Fay and other cases discussed herein).  For further discussion of
Festo, see infra Parts IX and X.
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IV. THE ADVENT OF PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
The amendment of claims, and the related practice of disclaiming
all or a portion of a claim, soon provided the basis for a second
limitation upon the notion that the patentee was presumed to have
encompassed all equivalent structures in his claim(s).  This doctrine
would later take the name by which we now know it:  “prosecution
history estoppel.”109
The Patent Act of 1836110 required patent holders to disclaim those
portions of their claimed inventions that the patent holders knew
were in the prior art, or had not been invented by them, or otherwise
not validly covered by the patent.111  If an inventor failed to do so, the
inventor risked the entire patent being declared invalid.112  The
disclaimer was said to protect the public because if a patentee did not
make the appropriate disclaimer, the patentee “prevents others from
attempting to improve upon the manner and process which he has
described in his spe[c]ification—and may deter the public from
using it, even if discovered.”113
The Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in Leggett v. Avery,114 firmly
established the proposition that subject matter, once intentionally
disclaimed, could not later be recaptured by the patentee through
subsequent expansion of the claims.115  The old patent statutes
permitted a patent holder to file for a seven year extension following
the original patent’s expiration.116  The patent holder in Leggett
applied for a seven year patent extension on an improved plow that
contained six claims.117  However, competitors opposed the approval
of the extension, asserting the claims were invalid because the claims
had been anticipated by the prior art.118  The Patent Office largely
                                                          
109. The term “prosecution history estoppel” was first used by the Federal Circuit
in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473, 484 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).  This is a modification of the previously used term—“file wrapper
estoppel”—which took its name from the “file wrapper” used to hold the contents of
a patent application in the Patent Office.  Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384
F.2d 391, 398-99 (Ct. Cl. 1967).   
110. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
111. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117.
112. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120-21 (1853) (stating a patentee
must disclaim overly broad claims in a patent or risk the entire patent being
nullified).
113. Id. at 120-21.
114. 101 U.S. 256 (1879).
115. See Leggett, 101 U.S. at 259 (stating that once a claim has been formally
abandoned, the patentee cannot later attempt to enjoin others from using the
disclaimed invention).
116. See Patent Act of 1870 § 66 (granting a seven year extension to an inventor
upon approval by the Commissioner of Patents).
117. Leggett, 101 U.S. at 258.
118. See id. at 258 (asserting the six claims contained in the extension application
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agreed with the competitors and granted the extension only after the
patent holder formally disclaimed the subject matter in all but the
fifth claim.119  However, following this resolution, the patent owner
sought and was granted a reissue of the extended patent containing
claims that were substantially similar to those claims that had been
previously disclaimed.120  Employing strong language against what it
perceived as fraudulent conduct, the Court held the reissued patent
invalid and declared that granting claims previously abandoned by
the patentee “is the occasion of immense frauds against the public.”121
Justice Bradley called it an abuse of the patent reissuance process, for
individuals, “under the pretense of inadvertence and mistake” to
reverse adverse decisions and secure the patent.122
In Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. United States Cartridge Co.,123 the
principle articulated in Leggett was first applied to estop a patent
owner from claiming infringement by equivalent structures that had
been expressly disclaimed in order to secure allowance of the
patent.124  The case involved Ethan Allen’s patent for “the first
successful organized automatic machine for heading cartridge shells”
which “furnished the essential principle of construction which has
been maintained in all succeeding heading machines of its class.”125
In 1873, the Remington company opposed Allen’s widow’s
application for a reissuance of the patent.126  The original patent
described a process in which a movable “die” struck a fixed “bunter”
to form the cartridge flange.127  In the reissue application, an attempt
was made to add a description in which the “bunter” could be made
movable and the “die” was fixed.128  The Patent Office determined
that this additional embodiment described “a substantially different
invention” and therefore could not permissibly be included in the
reissued patent.129  In response, Allen’s widow filed an express
disclaimer, which disclaimed the newly added particular structure,
                                                          
had been in use before the 1869 reissued patent was granted).
119. See id. (noting the formal disclaimer was filed in 1874).
120. See id. at 258-59 (concluding the first two claims in the reissued patents are
substantially the same as two claims the patentee previously disclaimed in 1874).
121. Id. at 258.
122. Leggett, 101 U.S. at 258.
123. 112 U.S. 624 (1884).
124. Union Metallic, 112 U.S. at 643-44 (stating the case was controlled by the
principles articulated in Leggett).
125. Id. at 632.  “Heading” is the process by which a flange or rim forms on the
cartridge.  Id.
126. Id. at 632.
127. Id. at 638.
128. Id.
129. Union Metallic, 112 U.S. at 633.
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but made an exception “in so far as the same by fair construction may
be deemed the mechanical equivalent of the fixed die.”130  Following
the Patent Office’s rejection of this attempted reservation, Allen’s
widow filed another disclaimer that completely omitted any
attempted reservations.131
The reissued patent, after being extended, was asserted against
defendants who used a similar machine with a movable “bunter” and
a fixed “die.”132  The trial judge held Leggett was not controlling
because the disclaimer was made simply to overcome the Patent
Office’s new matter objection.133  The Supreme Court disagreed.134
The Court viewed the disclaimer as “one of the facts of invention.”135
Therefore, the question was “not open now as to whether Allen
invented at any time the stationary die D and movable bunter E, or as
to whether it was, or is, or could be, a mechanical equivalent for the
movable die D and stationary bunter E, because those questions are
concluded by the disclaimer.”136   Notably, the Court used the term
“estopped” for the first time in an infringement analysis in view of a
disclaimer.137
The Court in Union Metallic, however, did not extend Leggett so far
as to impose a rule that barred a patent holder from asserting
infringement by equivalents in the absence of an express disclaimer
of equivalents.138  In Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis,139 decided
one year after Leggett, the Court established that an intentional
disclaimer did not bar equivalents for subject matter unaffected by
the disclaimer.140  The patent covered Cummings’ invention of
artificial teeth that were molded with soft rubber that was hardened
by Goodyear’s vulcanization process.141  Cummings’ specification
listed materials used in this process, including a substance known as
“gutta-percha.”142  However, during the prosecution of the reissue
                                                          
130. Id. at 633-34.
131. Id. at 643.
132. Id. at 636.
133. See id. at 639 (noting lower court’s interpretation that the case did not entail
the issue of invention but, rather, procedural formality).
134. Id. at 644.
135. Id. at 645.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 645.
138. Union Metallic, 112 U.S. at 645.
139. 102 U.S. 222 (1880).
140. See Goodyear, 102 U.S. at 238-39 (analyzing equivalents even though
amendment had been made and holding that the manufacturer of dental plates with
a product not equivalent to the one mentioned in the initial patent did not
constitute infringement of that patent).
141. Id. at 224.
142. Id. at 225.
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patent, Cummings, in a letter to the Patent Office, struck out
reference to gutta-percha and amended the specification to read, “I
do not claim the use of gutta-percha, or of any material which is
merely rendered plastic by heat and hardened by cooling, in the
manufacture of sets of artificial teeth . . . .”143
The question of infringement turned on whether the defendant’s
use of celluloid in a process which did not use the patented rubber
vulcanization steps was equivalent to what was claimed.144  The
Supreme Court determined that celluloid was not equivalent to
vulcanized rubber because celluloid was not manipulated by the
vulcanization process.145  It is important to note that the Court’s
analysis turned on whether celluloid and vulcanized rubber were
equivalent and not on the disclaimer of gutta-percha or like
materials, which was unrelated to the equivalence issue.146
In the 1885 case of Sargent v. Hall Safe & Lock Co.,147 the Court
equated amendments to claims following a Patent Office rejection to
intentional disclaimers.148  Nevertheless, the Court allowed that the
patent could still cover equivalents of the amended claims.149  The
patent application for a time-locked safe underwent a lengthy
prosecution in which the Patent Office rejected the claims multiple
times and the applicant made multiple amendments.150  Patents for
safes were numerous and many patentees had already suggested
using a timing device to prevent a safe from being opened during
unauthorized times.151  Only when the claims were amended to reflect
                                                          
143. Id. at 227.
144. See id. at 228-30 (finding that the process of vulcanization was an essential
element of patentee’s invention and stating that “when a product arrived at by
certain defined stages or processes is patented, only those things can be considered
equivalents for the elements of the manufacture which perform the same function in
substantially the same way”).
145. See id. at 229 (noting that celluloid is not vulcanite and “neither it nor its
agents are capable of being vulcanized . . .”).
146. See id. at 230 (conceding that a “patentee is protected against equivalents for
any part of his invention,” but concluding that “[c]elluloid is not an equivalent for
the material that the patent makes essential to the invention”).
147. 114 U.S. 63 (1885).
148. See id. at 86 (specifying that in patents for combinations of mechanisms,
certain limitations imposed by the inventor, especially those introduced into an
application having been formerly rejected “must be strictly construed against the
inventor and in favor of the public, and looked upon as in the nature
disclaimers . . . .”).
149. See id. (suggesting that the patent could still cover combinations which
contain elements “material to the combination” invented, claimed and restricted by
the patentee).
150. See id. at 76-83 (detailing the various rejections and amendments to the
specifications of a safe with a time device preventing the safe from being opened
even with the correct combination).
151. See id. at 76-81 (noting previous patents to Holbrook, Hollen, Rutherford and
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precisely the form and configuration of the lock-bolt did the Patent
Office issue the patent.152  Because the defendants’ locking device had
an entirely different construction, the Supreme Court agreed with
the lower court ruling of non-infringement.153  In so holding, the
Court equated the process of amending claims in response to the
prior art rejections made by the Patent Office to the practice of
intentional disclaimers.154  Interestingly, in the case of amended
claims, the Court did not state that all equivalents were barred as they
had been in Union Metallic, where the patentee had expressly
disclaimed equivalents.155  Rather, the amended claims were
examined in accordance with the rule laid down in Fay, Water-Meter
and Gage.156  Although each element of a patented combination was
considered material and therefore must be present in the accused
device for infringement to lie, those elements also could be met by
equivalent structures.157
One year later, in Shepard v. Carrigan,158 the Court linked the
concepts underlying Leggett and Fay.  Citing a prior art skirt protected
by a patent granted to McKee, the Patent Office rejected
MacDonald’s first patent application for an invention protecting the
bottom of long-trained women’s skirts.159  In response, MacDonald
amended her application to include a reference to the skirt protector
having a “plaited border.”160  The Patent Office then declared an
interference with a pending application of Chase.  The Patent Office
stated the subject matter of the interference to be “a skirt protector
having a fluted or plaited border.”161  MacDonald prevailed in the
interference, and the patent was issued to her.162  The defendant
against whom the patent was asserted successfully argued non-
infringement because their skirt protector lacked a plaited border.
                                                          
Little).
152. See Sargent, 114 U.S. at 73-83 (stating the precision in which the locking
mechanism was explained).
153. See id. at 85-86 (stating that while plaintiff is invention was limited to locks
with a rotating bold, defendants’ lock had a sliding-bolt).
154. Id. at 86; see also supra note 149.
155. See Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. United States Cartridges Co., 112 U.S.
624, 643-44 (1884).
156. See Sargent, 114 U.S. at 86 (citations omitted) (citing Fay, Water-Meter, and
Gage in holding that in a patent for a combination, where a patentee specifies certain
elements as entering into the combination, the court must thereafter recognize such
elements as material).
157. Id.
158. 116 U.S. 593 (1886).
159. Id. at 596-97.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 596 (noting that the patent issued to MacDonald specifically included
the element of a “plaited or fluted border”).
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The Court’s opinion in Shepard cites Leggett, as well as Fay and Union
Metallic, for the proposition that an applicant for a combination
patent who “is compelled by the patent-office to narrow his claim by
the introduction of a new element,” is prevented from later
broadening the claim by omitting the earlier-compelled limitation.163
The Court went on to define the ensuing infringement inquiry by
quoting the statement relied on in Sargent that “all [elements] must
be regarded as material, leaving open only the question whether an omitted
part is supplied by an equivalent device or instrumentality.”164
The cases that followed placed additional constraints on a
patentee’s ability to assert infringement by equivalent structures in
view of the patent prosecution, as well as the prior art.  In California
Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Shalicke,165 the Court, in finding no
infringement, ruled that the defendant was practicing exactly the
method previously disclaimed and thus made no inquiry into
equivalency.166  However, in Hurlbut v. Schillinger,167 where the
defendant was not practicing exactly what was disclaimed, the Court
made clear that an equivalency analysis was required.  In Hurlbut, the
Court clarified that the essential components of the patentee’s
specifications were that the blocks of pavement be “substantially
separate, made so by the permanent to temporary interposition of a
separating medium or a cutting instrument, so that one block could
upheave or be removed without disturbing the adjoining blocks.”168
                                                          
163. Shepard, 116 U.S. at 597.
164. Id. at 598 (quoting Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U.S. 408, 420 (1883)) (emphasis
added).  Shepard and Sargent involved amendments made following rejections by the
Patent Office on the basis of prior art.  The Court, in Crawford v. Heysinger, 123 U.S.
589 (1887), reached a similar result where the Patent Office made a rejection based
on another patentability defect—inoperability.  The patent examiner rejected claims
originally presented in the reissue application because the claim “does not present
an operative combination of mechanical devices for the purpose stated.”  Crawford,
123 U.S. at 603.  The examiner required a number of structural amendments before
he withdrew his rejections.  Id. at 603-04.  The result, according to the Court, was that
the patentee had “carefully limited himself, in those claims, to a stationary staple-
support or anvil, and a reciprocating slotted or recessed hammer or driver.”  Id. at
604.  The defendant’s device, however, had a driving device which the plaintiff
contended was equivalent.  The Court rejected the claim, citing Leggett, Fay, Sargent
and Shepard, because “[t]he patentee having imposed words of limitation upon
himself in his claims, especially when so required by the patent office in taking out
his reissue, is bound by such limitations, in subsequent suits on the resissued patent.”
Id. at 606.
165. 119 U.S. 401 (1886).
166. See California Paving, 119 U.S. at 407 (finding that defendant’s method of
laying pavement without creating “blocks” or interposing material between those
“blocks” was the method expressly disclaimed by the patentee as “the forming of
blocks from plastic material without interposing anything between their joints while
in the process of formation.”).
167. 130 U.S. 456 (1889).
168. See id. at 466 (noting that these essential components have been present in
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The Court distinguished the case at bar from California Paving
because in California Paving, the defendant was installing a pavement
of the type expressly disclaimed and “blocks” were not created in a
manner devised by the patentee.169  In Hurlbut, however, the Court
determined  that the defendant’s sectional concrete pavement, while
not separated by exactly the same material as used by the patentee,
was nevertheless laid in detached blocks and permitted removal
without disturbing the adjoining block, thereby accomplishing the
same result in the same manner as the patentee’s invention.170
In Sutter v. Robinson,171 decided the same day as California Paving,
the Court held that the prior art imposes an additional constraint on
an assertion of equivalents.172  Robinson’s patent was for a process of
re-sweating tobacco leaves in which the tobacco was held in a porous
wooden box to allow for steam to reach the tobacco.173  During
prosecution, the examiner required the inventor to state that the
essential feature of the invention was the use of a porous wooden
box, as opposed to a metal container used in the prior art.174  The
defendant’s apparatus used, as the container for the re-sweating
process, the original cases in which the tobacco had been shipped.
The Court stated the “ultimate question” was whether “the use of
cases, or boxes, or packages, in which the tobacco leaves are
originally packed by the producer is equivalent to the wooden
tobacco holder mentioned in the complainants’ specification.”175
According to the Court, if the two arrangements were not equivalent,
there was no infringement.176  However, if the two arrangements were
equivalent, the patent would have been deemed anticipated, because
a prior art patent taught use of the original tobacco containers for
re-sweating.177  Adopting this reasoning, the Court concluded that the
judgment of infringement must be reversed.
                                                          
every case where infringement of said patent has been found).
169. Id. at 465-66.
170. Sutter, 130 U.S. at 465-66.  The Court commented that the “invention of
Schillinger was a very valuable one.  The evidence is that it entirely superseded the
prior practice of laying concrete pavements in a continuous, adhering mass.”  Id. at
469.
171. 119 U.S. 530 (1886).
172. Id. at 541-42 (holding that a patentee cannot claim infringement where
equivalents of the invention have been anticipated for many years by the practice of
others that pre-dated the patent’s approval).
173. Id. at 531-35.
174. Id. at 535.
175. Id. at 542.
176. Id.
177. See Sutter, 119 U.S. at 537-38 (maintaining that the 1865 Huse patent showed
that the patentee’s invention was anticipated by others and used for many years prior
to the patent date).
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As the nineteenth century came to a close, Sutter v. Robinson and
the cases that preceded it had cemented in law the two limitations on
the doctrine of equivalents that persist to this day:  Under the first,
the rule of prosecution history estoppel, an equivalent structure
would not be found to infringe if the patentee had disclaimed
coverage of such a structure during his dealings with the Patent
Office (but such structure could infringe, even where the patent
claim had been narrowed during examination, if not the subject of
the narrowing or disclaimer).  Under the second limitation, the
patentee could not validly maintain an infringement action against a
defendant who was practicing the prior art.178
V. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS ENTERS THE 20TH CENTURY:
THE DEBATE OPENS ON THE IMPACT OF PROSECUTION HISTORY
ESTOPPEL
At the twentieth century began, the Supreme Court was hearing
fewer patent cases, due mainly to the creation of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals in the 1890s.179  Following the establishment of the Circuit
Courts, the Supreme Court heard patent cases generally when the
United States was a party, or when the circuit courts were in conflict
regarding a particular patent or on an important question of patent
law.   
The Supreme Court did, however, have an opportunity to
summarize the state of the law in Hubbell v. United States.180  The
invention in Hubbell was for a certain configuration of an ammunition
cartridge.181  The patent application was rejected initially for prior art
and later for being “vague, indefinite and ambiguous.”182  The claims
were allowed only when the patentee added claim language requiring
“two or more openings, whose inner edges nearly coincide with the
                                                          
178. See, e.g., Bragg v. Fitch, 121 U.S. 478 (1887).  In Bragg, the Court placed an
additional gloss on this rule.  The Court determined that the invention for a snap
hook was made in such a crowded art that “[o]ne would hardly suppose that a
patentable invention could have been made in relation to this little device.”  Id. at
480.  Several prior art patents put in evidence showed near anticipation of the
patented invention.  Id. at 481-82.  Thus, the Court held, “[i]t is obvious from the
foregoing review of prior patents, that the invention of Bristol, if his snap-hook
contains a patentable invention, is but one in a series of improvements all having the
same general object and purpose; and that in construing the claims of his patent they
must be restricted to the precise form and arrangement of parts described in his
specification, and to the purpose indicated therein.”  Id. at 483.
179. See Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 43, 44, 46, 604, 711, 713, 961, 962, 2101, 2106, 2107)
(establishing the circuit courts of appeal).
180. 179 U.S. 77 (1900).
181. Id. at 80-81 (describing the invention in detail).
182. Id. at 82.
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edges of the central chamber of fulminate in the base of the
cartridge . . . .”183  The Court stated that where a patentee makes
“mere changes to expression, having substantially the same meaning”
to an application in order to meet the examiner’s requirement, the
patentee will not be penalized by an unfairly limiting construction of
the claim’s terms.184
The Court in Hubbell, however, viewed the patentee’s amendments
as reaching beyond “mere changes of expression.”185  The Court
noted that the additional limitations to the openings were made in
response to the Patent Office’s rejections for anticipatory prior art,
showing similar breech-loading ammunition cartridges.186  The Court
held that these amendments put the patentee “within the range of
authorities which hold that if the claim to a combination be restricted
to specified elements, all must be regarded as material, and that
limitations imposed by the inventor . . . must be strictly construed
against the inventor and in favor of the public . . . .”187  After
determining that the patent was for a combination, the Court, citing
Fay v. Cordesman,188 Sargent v. Hall Safe & Lock Co.,189 Shepard v.
Carrigan,190 and Union Water Meter Co. v. Desper,191 defined the issue as
whether the defendant’s invention fell within the scope of the
patentee’s combination in light of the amended claim.192  Concluding
there was “an essential difference” between the two cartridges, the
                                                          
183. Id. at 82-83.
184. See Hubbell, 179 U.S. at 80-83 (finding that the applicant originally expressed
his invention in terms of its individual elements and later changed that expression to
cover the combination of those elements).
185. See id. at 83 (finding that the amendments clearly established the actual
position of the vents as being a material part of claimant’s patent).
186. See Hubbell, 179 U.S. at 83 (listing the patents which anticipated
breech-loading ammunition cartridges).
187. Id. at 83-84.
188. See 109 U.S. 408, 420-21 (1883) (stating the patentee determines which
elements are material to the combination and that the court may not regard as
immaterial a specific element set forth by the patentee as entering into the
combination).
189. See 114 U.S. 63, 86 (1885) (holding that “in patents for combination of
mechanism, limitations imposed by the inventor, especially such as were introduced
into an application after it had been persistently rejected, must be strictly construed
against the inventor and in favor of the public, and looked upon as in the nature of
disclaimers.”).
190. See 116 U.S. 593, 598 (1886) (asserting that if an applicant, “in order to get
his patent, accepts one with a narrower claim than contained in his original
application, he is bound by it.”).
191. See 101 U.S. 332, 337 (1879) (requiring that a patentee specify what claims
are new and assert that if a patentee restrict the claim’s form and combination of
elements, the court is precluded from declaring that any one of these elements is
immaterial).
192. Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77, 82-85 (1900).
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Court found no infringement.193
Seven years later in Computing Scale Co. of America v. Automatic Scale
Co.,194 the Court decided another case in which the claim had been
amended to avoid a rejection based upon prior art.195  The Court
described the invention—a spring-balance scale—as “an
improvement” in the field rather than a “pioneer[ing]” invention.196
The Court, quoting Hubbell, stated amendments that comprise “mere
changes of expression . . . ought not be permitted to defeat a
meritorious claimant.”197  The Court thus reinforced this formulation
of the rule that the Court characterized as being “as favorable to the
inventor as previous cases would admit.”198  However, because the
patentee in responding to the Patent Office’s rejections limited the
claim to “specific means,” the Court regarded this limitation as a
“narrowing” of the claim.199  Accordingly, the Court continued, the
“novel feature” of the invention “is of that narrow character of
invention which does not entitle the patentee to any considerable
range of equivalents, but must be practically limited to the means
shown by the inventor.”200  The Court contrasted the narrow range of
equivalent structures covered by the particular patent with the “wide
range of equivalents” that might have been available to a pioneering
invention.201
In the next major patent case involving the question of
infringement, Weber Elec. Co. v. E.H. Freeman Elec. Co.,202 the Court
dealt with another “narrow” invention.203  The Patent Office rejected
the original application on the basis of prior art.204  The applicant, in
order to procure the patent, amended the claim by adding
limitations to a certain type of rotary movement between an
incandescent lamp and socket.205  The Court held that the accused
                                                          
193. Id. at 86.
194. 204 U.S. 609 (1907).
195. Id. at 618-20 (setting forth the Patent Office’s rejections of patentee’s original
claims in view  of prior existing patents).
196. Id. at 615.
197. Computing Scale, 204 U.S. at 617-18 (quoting Hubbell v. United States, 179
U.S. 77, 80 (1900)).
198. Id. at 617.
199. Id. at 620.
200. Id. at 621.
201. See id. (reiterating that since the invention was only an improvement of
others already in use, the invention could only be sustained to a limited extent and
“does not entitle the patentee to any considerable range of equivalents”).
202. 256 U.S. 668 (1921).
203. See id. at 669 (stating that “[t]he patent is a simple and . . . a narrow one.”).
204. Id. at 676.
205. See id. at 677 (stating that the patentee, in order to avoid a prior art
construction that required rotary movement, “clearly [implied] that no such rotary
movement was necessary in the adjustment of his socket.”).
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device, which lacked this rotary movement, did not infringe.206
However, the Court, in stating the rule, introduced a distinctly
different concept:
Having thus narrowed his claim against rotary movement in order
to obtain a patent, the patentee may not by construction, or by
resort to the doctrine of equivalents, give to the claim the larger
scope which it might have had without the amendments, which
amount to a disclaimer of rotation as an operative feature of his
device.207
The Court’s formulation in Weber Electric marked a subtle, but
significant change in the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence.  The
reference to the “disclaimer” effect of an amendment was, of course,
not new.  The term originated in the cases that involved express
disclaimers.208  Beginning with Sargent, the Court had equated
amendments made to overcome prior art rejections in the Patent
Office to disclaimers.209  But in the prior cases, the Court had stated
that the patentee was nonetheless entitled to a “fair construction” of
the amended claims,210 which left open the question of “whether an
omitted part is supplied by an equivalent device or instrumentality.”211
The Court’s formulation in Weber Electric, in contrast, seemingly
barred any reliance on the doctrine of equivalents for amended
claims—even a scope that included equivalents but avoided the prior
art.  In other words, what was now at stake was whether a patent
owner could assert a claim to cover the equivalent, yet patentable,
middle ground between the literal limit of a claim and the prior art.
Indeed, the Court’s next significant patent law decision, I.T.S.
Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co.,212 added to the ambiguity.  In I.T.S.
Rubber, the Court again faced a patent that had been amended to
overcome prior art.213  Ruling consistently with Sargent, Shepard and
Hubbell, the Court held that once an applicant has limited the claim
                                                          
206. Id. at 678.
207. Weber Elec., 256 U.S. at 677-78 (citing Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593, 598
(1886); Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77, 80 (1900)).
208. See, e.g., Sargent v. Hall Safe & Lock Co., 114 U.S. 63, 86 (1885) (equating
limitations imposed by the inventor on combinations of mechanism to disclaimers,
especially where the limitations were introduced in order to make a rejected
application acceptable to the Patent Office); Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. United
States Cartridge Co., 112 U.S. 624, 639-45 (1884) (discussing the meaning of the
term “disclaimer” in the patent context).
209. Sargent, 114 U.S. at 86.
210. Hubbell, 179 U.S. at 80.
211. Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U.S. 408, 421 (1883).
212. 272 U.S. 429 (1926).
213. See I.T.S. Rubber, 272 U.S. at 439-40 (detailing the process in which the
applicant rubber company limited the specific form of its rubber heel to a “three
point contact” life in response to the Patent examiner’s rejections).
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by amendment and accepted a patent, the limitations are construed
as disclaimers that bind the applicant.214  The Court then took a
further step by stating “[t]he patentee is thereafter estopped to claim
the benefit of his rejected claim or such a construction of his
amended claim as would be equivalent thereto.”215
The circuit courts of appeal, which had by the turn of the century
taken a prominent role in determining patent law, began to grapple
with the ambiguity stemming from the Supreme Court’s explanation
of the effect of narrowing claim amendments on the doctrine of
equivalents.216  The question which became increasingly important
was where the patent owner had narrowed the claim in view of prior
art, was some range of equivalents nevertheless available to protect
the patent owner against close imitations of the patented invention?
The language in Shepard, Sargent and Fay stating that the elements
amended to avoid the prior art “must be regarded as material, leaving
open only the question whether an omitted part is supplied by an
equivalent device or instrumentality,”217 suggested a limited range of
equivalents would be available to the patentee even after a narrowing
amendment, so long as the patentee was not asserting equivalence
over what precisely had been disclaimed and did not attempt to
                                                          
214. Id. at 443-44.
215. Id. at 444 (quoting Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425,
429 (1894)).  The citation to Morgan Envelope is dicta arguably taken out of context.
In Morgan Envelope, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant was not liable for
infringement of plaintiff’s patent on a toilet paper dispensing mechanism because
the defendants were merely manufacturing rolls of toilet paper and selling them in
combination with dispensing mechanisms they had purchased from the plaintiff.  In
a classic application of the first-sale doctrine, the Court ruled that “[t]he patentee
having once received his royalty upon such a device, he cannot treat the subsequent
seller or user as an infringer.”  Id. at 432.  In construing the patent, the Court
commented that the patentee was not entitled to include the toilet paper roll as part
of the claimed combination even though the patentee had claimed the dispenser
“substantially as described.”  The reason was because “the patentee having once
presented his claim in that form [the original claim included “a bundle of paper” as
an element], and the patent office having rejected it, and he having acquiesced in
such rejection, he is, under the repeated decisions of this court, now estopped to
claim the benefit of his rejected claim or such a construction of his present claim as
would be equivalent thereto.”  Id. at 429 (citing Leggett v. Avery, 101 U.S. 256, 259-60
(1879); Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593, 597 (1886); Crawford v. Heysinger, 123
U.S. 589, 606 (1887); Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. United States Cartridge Co.,
112 U.S. 624, 645 (1884)).
216. Compare Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U.S. 408, 420-21 (1883) (suggesting that a
patentee is afforded some protection against infringement beyond those elements
specifically identified in the patent by emphasizing that a patentee has the authority
to specify particular elements as immaterial, raising the question as to whether those
elements omitted are protected due to equivalency), with Hubbell v. United States,
179 U.S. 77 (1900) (articulating that limitations on a claim, especially those imposed
by the inventor to overcome an examiner’s rejection should be strictly construed
against the inventor).
217. Fay, 109 U.S. at 421.
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extend the claim to cover prior art.  However, the language that
originated in Sargent,218 later echoed in Hubbell and re-stated in Weber
Electric and I.T.S. Rubber, could be understood as erecting an absolute
bar to the availability of any equivalents, even where infringement was
asserted for an equivalent element unrelated to any claim
amendment.
The circuit courts initially took the view more in keeping with the
earlier Supreme Court cases.  For example, in the 1915 case of New
York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney,219 the Eighth Circuit held that the
patentee was not estopped from asserting infringement of his
amended claim.220  In Southern Textile Machine Co. v. United Hosiery
Mills Corp.,221 the Sixth Circuit likewise rejected the argument that
claims amended in response to prior art rejections should be “strictly
construed” against patentees to bar all resort to the doctrine of
equivalents.222  The court concluded that prosecution history estoppel
does not strip a patentee of protection against all equivalents and
reiterated that a patentee is protected against close equivalents.223
VI. THE DEPRESSION ERA COURT:  THE BALANCE TURNS AWAY FROM
THE PATENT OWNER  IN PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL CASES
As the Depression set in, the Supreme Court took a decided turn in
a direction away from the neutral balance between patent holder and
would-be competitor that had existed previously in the patent
jurisprudence.224  The Depression-Era Court differed from previous
                                                          
218. See Sargent, 114 U.S. at 86.  The Court asserted that “limitations and provisos,
imposed by the inventor, especially such as were introduced into an application after
it had been persistently rejected, must be strictly construed against the inventor and
in favor of the public, and looked upon in light of disclaimers.”  Id.
219. 224 F. 452 (8th Cir. 1915).
220. See id. at 462 (asserting that even if a patentee accepts a patent on an
amended claim, the patentee is not barred from securing through an amended claim
new and useful improvements).  “[O]ne who acquiesces in the rejection of his claim
because it is said to be anticipated by other patents or references is not thereby
estopped from claiming and securing by an amended claim every novel and useful
improvement that is not described in those references.”  Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
221. 33 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1929).
222. See id. at 865 (explaining that the patentee’s invention had made a “profound
impression on the art,” is accepted and used in the trade as a radical improvement
from prior inventions, and therefore should be protected).
223. See id. at 866 (limiting the scope of the estoppel and claiming that the
purpose is to prevent the patentee’s reliance on broad constructions that could
unfairly block other similar inventions).
224. See generally Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, III, The Rosetta Stone
for the Doctrines of Means-Plus-Function Patents, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227,
263-64 (1997) (outlining the dramatic increase in the courts’ invalidation of patents
from the mid-1920s to the mid-1950s).  See, e.g., Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic
Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941) (exemplifying the high standard the Court
employed for upholding a patent as a “flash of creative genius”).
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Courts in economic policy and viewed patent protection as somewhat
inconsistent with policies held to promote competition.225  The cases
that best illustrated this trend involved other legal doctrines, such as
the “patent misuse doctrine.”226  However, the trend is also evident in
the Court’s seeming abandonment of the theory that patent owners
are entitled to prevent close imitations of their invention in the
patentable middle ground between the literal language of the claim
and prior art, even if that claim was amended to avoid the prior art.
In Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, Inc.,227 the patent was for a device
that moved a lure ahead of racing dogs on a track.228  Due to prior art,
the claim was amended to include limitations to a hinged horizontal
arm carrying the lure and a supporting wheel on the end of the
arm.229  The alleged infringer created a design that eliminated the
need for the supporting wheel.230  Relying on the doctrine of
equivalents, the patentee asserted infringement.231  However, in
rejecting the patentee’s reliance on the doctrine of equivalents, the
Court stated “where a patentee has narrowed his claim, in order to
escape rejection, he may not ‘by resort to the doctrine of equivalents,
give to the claim the larger scope which it might have had without the
amendments which amount to disclaimer’.”232
Four years later, in Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Engineering
Corp.,233 the Court again was presented with a patent claim that had
been narrowed to avoid prior art.234  The original broad claims were
                                                          
225. See generally Hofmann, supra note 229, at 263 (explaining that patent law and
judicial decisions regarding patent law historically have been shaped by the social
and political context in which they have developed, and further noting that during
the Depression, the nation’s economic and social situation reduced the perceived
value of patents to economic growth).
226. See, e.g., Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (rejecting the idea that the proper remedy for the Patent Office’s
tendency to grant patents is the Supreme Court’s overwhelming instinct to strike
them down); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1944)
(highlighting the misuse of a patent and decrying the evils of the “patent
monopoly”); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680,
684 (1944) (holding that an owner of a patent cannot use the patent to limit
competition).
227. 282 U.S. 784 (1931).
228. Id. at 786.
229. Id. at 788-89.
230. Id. at 787-88.
231. Id. at 789.
232. Id. at 790 (quoting Weber Elec. Co. v. Freeman Elec. Co., 256 U.S. 668, 677-
78 (1921)).
233. 294 U.S. 42 (1935).
234. See id. at 47 (explaining that the patentee originally applied for a broad
patent, which was rejected because the submitted patent claims overlapped with
prior patented inventions).
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cancelled after prior art rejections by the Patent Office.235  The
patentee submitted narrower claims that were subsequently
approved.236  Based on the specific language of the patents, the Court
insisted that the patent be strictly construed and limited in scope.237
The Court stated, “we find no justification for enlarging the scope of
what is described, but rather [we adhere to] the requirement of strict
limitation to that which is specified . . . .”238
In Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co.,239 the Court addressed
the question of whether the patent-in-suit was valid over the prior
art.240  The issue turned on whether the claims for a piston and
cylinder arrangement properly could be read to include a “flexible
web.”241  Without this “flexible web” as a limitation, the patents could
not be distinguished over the prior art.  The patentee initially
presented claims including a flexible web limitation, but had
withdrawn them during the course of an interference proceeding.242
In view of this history, the Court held that the claim that had issued
could not be construed as including a flexible web.243    In making this
unremarkable holding related to the invalidity of the patent, the
Court appeared to go out of its way to give this summary, in dicta, of
the state of the law on a different issue—the doctrine of equivalents:
It is a rule of patent construction consistently observed that a claim
in a patent as allowed must be read and interpreted with reference
to claims that have been cancelled or rejected and the claims
allowed cannot by construction be read to cover what was thus
eliminated from the patent. The patentee may not, by resort to the
doctrine of equivalents, give to an allowed claim a scope which it
might have had without the amendments, the cancellation of which
amounts to a disclaimer.  The injurious consequences to the public
and to inventors and patent applicants if patentees were thus
permitted to revive cancelled or rejected claims and restore them
                                                          
235. Id.
236. See id. at 47-48 (explaining that the revised claims used specific and narrow
language to distinguish the invention from prior inventions).
237. Id. at 48-49.
238. Id. at 49.
239. 311 U.S. 211 (1940).
240. Id. at 214-17.
241. See id. at 218 (noting that the appellate court relied on the flexible web
feature as the only distinguishing characteristic from prior patented inventions).
242. See id. at 219-20 (outlining a series of claim amendments submitted while the
patent was pending that referred to the flexible web, which the patentee later
withdrew).
243. See id. at 219-20 (noting that the only difference between the patent with the
amendments and the final version without the amendments was the reference to the
flexible web).
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to their patents are manifest. 244
After re-stating the legal framework in dicta in Schriber-Schroth, the
Court next dealt with the issue of equivalents in Exhibit Supply Co. v.
Ace Patents Corp.245  Exhibit Supply involved a patent for a contact switch
for pinball machines.246  The Patent Office rejected the original claim,
drawn to a device having electrical conductors “carried by the table,”
in view of prior art.247  In response, the patentee amended the claim
by narrowing the patent to cover conductors that were “embedded
in” the table.248  This limiting language satisfied the patent examiner
and the Patent Office issued the patent.249  The question presented
was whether the addition of “and embedded in,” included to
distinguish the prior art, also estopped the patentee from relying
upon the doctrine of equivalents to claim infringement by a device
that included conductors that were not literally “embedded in” the
table but were nevertheless concededly the mechanical equivalents of
such conductors.250
The Supreme Court began the discussion by reciting what it called
the “settled” law that prevented the doctrine of equivalents from
“recaptur[ing] claims which the patentee has surrendered by
amendment.”251  The Court then asserted that adding limiting
language to overcome a prior art rejection required the patent’s
language to be strictly construed.252  The Court’s description of the
consequence of such a strict construction, however, departed in the
most clear terms yet from its nineteenth century jurisprudence:  “By
the amendment [the patentee] recognized and emphasized the
                                                          
244. Id. at 220-21.  The Court cited many of the fundamental doctrine of
equivalents precedents set out earlier in this paper, including, Shepard v. Carrigan,
116 U.S. 593; Sutter v. Robinson, 119 U.S. 530; Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77;
Weber Elec. Co. v. E. H. Freeman Electric Co., 256 U.S. 668; I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Essex
Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429; Smith v. Magic City Club, 282 U.S. 784; and Leggett v. Avery,
101 U.S. 256, 259, 25 L. Ed. 865.
245. 315 U.S. 126 (1942).
246. Id. at 127.
247. Id. at 128.
248. Id. at 129 n.1, 133-34.  The final approved language of the patent read in
pertinent part:
[T]o enable the spring to be resiliently flexed . . . in the [electric] circuit and
constituting a conductor, and conductor means in said circuit and embedded
in the table at a point spaced from the standard and engageable by a portion
of the spring when it is flexed to close the [electric] circuit.
Id. at 129 n.1 (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 133-34.
250. Exhibit Supply Co., 315 U.S. at 135-36.
251. See id. at 136 (asserting the general rule that once a patentee had amended a
claim to overcome rejection based on prior art, the patentee cannot claim a broad
scope to include the prior art).
252. Id. at 137.  In supporting this rationale, the Court relied on Magic City Kennel
Club, 282 U.S. at 790 and Shepard, 116 U.S. at 598.
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difference between the two phrases and proclaimed his
abandonment of all that is embraced in that difference.”253
Thus, while the Court appeared only to be re-stating the original
reasoning of some of its early cases by emphasizing the “disclaimer”
aspect of patent claim amendments, the Court did not carry forward
the qualifying statements in those cases that still permitted some
analysis of a scope of equivalents for the narrowed claim.254  In other
words, despite casting the doctrine in terms of “abandonment,”
“disclaimer,” and “estoppel,” the Supreme Court appeared to discard
the fairness inquiry that normally would be associated with such
equitable concepts.255  Under this new rubric, application of an
estoppel theory apparently would no longer hinge—as it had in the
past—on an analysis of what subject matter the patentee was “expressly
required to abandon and disavow as a condition of the grant.”256
Exhibit Supply would be the last significant word from the Supreme
Court on the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel until the end
of the twentieth century.  Interestingly, the doctrine’s treatment in
the circuit courts of appeals prior to the formation of the Federal
Circuit in 1982 indicates that the various circuit courts did not
universally understand the Supreme Court to have departed as
sharply from its previous, more flexible application of estoppel as the
language in Exhibit Supply seemed to indicate.
VII. THE POST-WORLD WAR II TREATMENT OF PROSECUTION HISTORY
ESTOPPEL IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
In the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
addressed the doctrine of equivalents in only two other cases prior to
Festo.257  Thus, the evolution of this doctrine in the circuit courts is
                                                          
253. Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added) (citing Hubbell v. United
States; Weber Elec. Co. v. E. H. Freeman Elec. Co.; I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Essex
Rubber Co.; Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club; and Schriber- Schroth Co. v. Cleveland
Trust Co.).
254. See, e.g., Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593, 598 (1886) (providing for
consideration of some range of equivalents for amended claim).
255. See, e.g., Sutter v. Robinsion, 119 U.S. 530, 541 (1886) (suggesting that if a
patentee was not expressly required to abandon an element of the claim to overcome
prior art rejection, the patentee should be afforded the opportunity to rely upon the
doctrine of equivalents despite voluntary abandonment of the element).
256. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
257. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09
(1950) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents is necessary to prevent
“unscrupulous copyists” from replicating inventions and disguising the copying by
making insubstantial changes); and Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 34 (1997) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents is not
inconsistent with the Patent Act and that the doctrine must be applied to each
element of a patent claim and not to the invention as a whole).
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critical to the understanding of the doctrine’s overall history.
Perhaps because of its harsh impact on patent holders, it was not long
before the tendency to distinguish, qualify, or simply ignore Exhibit
Supply began to manifest itself in certain circuits.  The treatment of
this issue in the various circuits was anything but uniform, however.
In Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading, Inc.,258 the Second Circuit
held that the estoppel described in Exhibit Supply and Schriber-Schroth
did not arise from circumstances that were unrelated to the core
requirements for obtaining a patent.  In Musher, claims were
cancelled solely for the purpose of restating those claims in a
continuation application.  The court found that where a patent
applicant cancels a claim that already has been allowed, the rationale
of Exhibit Supply and Schriber-Schroth does not apply.259  Rather,
according to the court, the proper question is whether the applicant
“intends to surrender the disclosure in such sense that [the
applicant] abandons any equivalents of the elements of those claims
which [the applicant] keeps.”260  Because the court held that the
applicant in Musher had no such intent, the first claim was entitled to
the range of equivalents that would have applied had the claims not
been cancelled.261  Inasmuch as the allowed claims had been
cancelled only for continuation purposes, no estoppel arose because
the patent holder did not manifest an intent to abandon the claims.262
Subsequent decisions concentrated in the Seventh Circuit
uncritically applied Exhibit Supply and Schriber-Schroth to bar reliance
on the doctrine of equivalents where claim language was changed
due to prior art rejection, even where the addition of a limitation
precluding literal infringement was unnecessary to distinguish prior
art.263  Only some of these decisions even analyze the particular
limitations added and their relationship to the prior art upon which
the rejection was based,264 or at least discuss generally what happened
                                                          
258. 150 F.2d 885, 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183 (2d Cir. 1945).
259. Musher, 150 F.2d at 888, 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 186.
260. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 186.
261. See id., 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 186 (stating that “when the defendant
lengthened the time and reduced the temperature, it adopted the equivalent of a
‘short’ time and a ‘slightly elevated temperature.’”).
262. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 186.
263. See, e.g., Peters & Russell, Inc. v. Dorfman, 188 F.2d 711, 714-15, 89 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 351, 354-55 (7th Cir. 1951) (adjudicating a case in which several claims were
rejected over prior art and consequently the patentee had specified and limited the
claim to the literal embodiment described in the application ).
264. See, e.g., Lewis v. Avco Mfg. Corp., 228 F.2d 919, 926-27, 108 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
147, 153 (7th Cir. 1956) (discussing applicant’s lengthy application process ending
only when applicant amended the claim to include a limitation); Kromer v. Riegel
Textile Corp., 227 F.2d 741, 743-44, 107 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 317, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1955)
(describing applicant’s amendments to claims after claims were rejected); Dixie Cup
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during prosecution history.265  Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills, Inc. v.
Davis Co.266 exemplifies the courts’ approach during this period.
In Baker-Cammack, the patentee had attempted to broaden his
claims in a reissue application to eliminate a particular limitation
present in some, but not all, of the claims.  The broader reissue
claims were rejected based on prior art.  The patentee subsequently
withdrew the reissue application and requested reinstatement of his
original patent claims.  When the patentee asserted the original
claims against an alleged equivalent device, the court held that even
the original claims that had not included the particular limitation in
issue should be read to include that limitation because the broader
claims had been canceled in the reissue application.  The court
reasoned that to read the claims otherwise would allow the patentee
to assert infringement against a device that literally embodied a claim
that was presented, but then abandoned, during the reissue
proceeding.267
The Fifth Circuit took a decidedly different tack than did the
Seventh Circuit in its first post-Exhibit Supply prosecution history
estoppel case, Hunt Tool Co. v. Lawrence.268  Hunt Tool involved three
patents, two of which raised important and different prosecution
history estoppel issues.269  The claims of the first patent had been
amended in response to a rejection for formal matters under 35
U.S.C. § 112.270  The court held that only amendments made in
response to prior art rejections could give rise to an estoppel.271  This
                                                          
Co. v. Paper Contained Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 645, 648, 78 U.S.P.Q 222, 224-25 (7th Cir.
1948) (explaining the effect of patentee’s amendments and the patentee’s belief that
amendments were necessary to distinguish the claims from prior art).
265. See, e.g.,  United States Air Conditioning Corp. v. Governair Corp., 216 F.2d
430, 433, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 231, 233-34 (10th Cir. 1954) (explaining applicant’s
process of amending claims after they were rejected); Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc., 196 F.2d 103, 109, 93 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 137,
141 (7th Cir. 1952) (“But more important is the history attached to these claims and,
more particularly, the controverted language from the time the claims emerged from
the Patent Office until the commencement of the instant litigation.”).
266. 181 F.2d 550, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 94 (4th Cir. 1950).
267. See id. at 563, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 117.
268. 242 F.2d 347, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 7 (5th Cir. 1957).
269. See id. at 348, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 (describing the patents, which dealt
with tools designed to extract obstructing objects from oil wells).
270. Id. at 353 and n.3, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 12 n.3.  35 U.S.C. § 112 requires
that the patent application meet certain formal requirements.  Section 112 imposes
standards of clarity, requiring that the invention be described “in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains . . . to make and use [the invention], and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out [the] invention.”  35 U.S.C. § 112
(1995).
271. See Hunt Tool, 242 F.2d at 354, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 12-13 (explaining that
because the patent examiner’s objection was with reference to the prior art, file
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holding is consistent with the fact that virtually all of the cases that
had applied the rule dating back to Leggett v. Avery272 had done so
where the patent holder narrowed the claim to avoid prior art rather
than for matters of form.273
The prosecution history of the second patent presented a closer
question.274  The initial rejection due to prior art was overcome by
amendments.275  The patentee had narrowed the phrase “a piston on
a string” to “a piston fixed on the string.”276  The defendant’s device
consisted of a piston that was not rigidly fixed to a string, but was
pulled by a string as if fixed.277  The court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the insertion of the term “fixed” in the claim, in
response to a prior art rejection, estopped the patentee from
asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.278  The
court reasoned that “the several patents cited [by the PTO] do not
make such a distinction a plausible ground for the rejection.”279
Simply stated, the court took the view that the change in terminology
to include the word “fixed” was not material in overcoming the prior
art.  The court further clarified that certain other changes in wording
between the allowed claim and the original rejected claim were for
“clarification.”280  Therefore, the court allowed the patent owner to
cover, by the doctrine of equivalents, part of the patentable middle
ground between the rejected and amended claims.281
In Hunt Tool, the court made no citation or reference either to
                                                          
wrapper estoppel would protect the appellants only if the alleged infringement is in
“an area to which the prior art could possibly have been thought to extend so as to
make it impossible to make valid claims there.”).
272. 101 U.S. 256 (1879).
273. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (explaining that the only notable
exception in this long line of cases was Crawford v. Heysinger, 123 U.S. 589 (1887),
which presented an equally problematic patentability problem: an initial claim to a
device that was inoperative in the absence of claim elements that were later added to
gain allowance).  The modern day requirements for an operative device are found in
the Patent Statute, which requires the claimed invention be “useful.”  35 U.S.C. § 101
(1994).
274. See Hunt Tool Co. v. Lawrence, 242 F.2d 347, 353, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 7, 12
(5th Cir. 1957) (explaining that the situation with regard to the Lawrence patent was
more difficult to evaluate because the original claim’s rejection conflicted with the
prior art and a comparison with those claims allowed showed the difference to be
that “the grapple will be moved upwardly upon application of fluid into the
cylinder.”).
275. Id., 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 12.
276. Id. at 354, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 12.
277. See id. at 349, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 9 (describing the technical aspects of the
defendant’s invention).
278. Id. at 352, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 11.
279. Id. at 353, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 12.
280. Id., 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 12.
281. Id. at 354, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 13.
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Exhibit Supply or to Schriber-Schroth.  Instead, the court cited New York
Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney,282  for the proposition that “file wrapper
estoppel” protects a defendant only where the alleged infringement is
“in an area to which the prior art could possibly have been thought to
extend so as to make it impossible to make valid claims there, for there
is no reason to presume that an applicant made a disclaimer broader
than necessary to yield to the actual challenge” by the Patent Office.283
Hunt Tool represented the first major post-World War II circuit
court case squarely to depart from the absolute rule implied by
Exhibit Supply and return to the more balanced approach forged in
the 1880s.284  The Fifth Circuit adhered to the more flexible rule in
Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,285 where the court quoted Hunt Tool,
stating “an applicant should not be presumed to have made a
disclaimer broader than necessary to yield to the actual challenge to
his claim.”286
Following Ziegler, however, even the Fifth Circuit began to waiver.
The continuing vitality of Hunt Tool was questioned by Nationwide
Chemical Corp. v. Wright.287  The patent was a “method for combating
infections in plants growing in soil infested with [certain] pathogenic
micro-organisms.”288  The relevant claim identified a known
bacteriacide (hexachlorophene)289 and called for application “at a
dosage of less than 4 ounces” of hexachlorophene per acre.290  The
patent owner brought an infringement suit against a competitor who
manufactured a hexachlorophene product with parallel instructions
except the competitor recommended a dosage of 4.73 ounces per
acre.291  Unlike in Hunt Tool and Ziegler, the court in Nationwide
                                                          
282. 224 F. 452 (8th Cir. 1915).
283. Hunt Tool, 242 F.2d at 354, 133 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 12 (emphasis added).
284. See supra Part IV (discussing the willingness of courts to allow patents to cover
equivalents of the amended claims).
285. 483 F.2d 858, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (5th Cir. 1973).
286. Id. at 871, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 489 (citing Hunt Tool, 242 F.2d at 354, 113
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 13).
287. 584 F.2d 714, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257 (5th Cir. 1978).
288. Id. at 715 n.1, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 258 n.1.
289. Id. at 715 n.1, 716, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 258 n.1.
290. Id., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 258 n.1. This dosage limitation had been added
during prosecution in response to a rejection by the examiner over a prior art
reference.  The reference disclosed a method of achieving the desired effect by aerial
spraying of a much heavier dose of chemical (48 ounces per acre).  The examiner
asserted that this reference anticipated the original claim, which had not specified a
dosage.  Id.
291. See Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 832, 192 U.S.P.Q.
95, 99 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (citing trial record which specified the recommend dosage),
aff’d, 584 F.2d 714, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257 (5th Cir. 1978).  The plaintiff argued
that although the “less than 4 ounces” limitation was added in response to the
examiner’s rejection over the cited reference, the particular dosage chosen—4
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Chemical refused to probe the reasons behind the change in claim
language.  Instead the court reasoned “[t]he simpler solution [was]
to look at the question of whether the patentee had to insert a
limitation in the broader sense.”292  In support of this approach, the
court cited, as “most nearly on point,”293 the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Ecko Products Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co.294
The Ecko court recognized that “file wrapper estoppel arises only
through amendment and cancellation of claims to overcome
rejection.”295  Therefore, the inquiry focused on whether the patentee
was forced to introduce an element in order to avoid rejection.296
Where a patentee narrowed the claim after rejection, the Nationwide
Chemical court followed the Ecko holding that the patentee “is held
strictly to the letter of the limited claims granted.”297  Agreeing with the
Seventh Circuit’s holding, the Nationwide Chemical court concluded
that because Nationwide, forced to introduce dosage restrictions,
chose “less than 4 ounces per acre,” Nationwide was held “strictly to
the letter of the limited claims granted.”298
The Nationwide Chemical court, however, did discuss instances in
which the rule of Hunt Tool would be appropriate,299 and in so doing,
                                                          
ounces per acre—was not relevant to avoiding the reference which, as stated, taught
48 ounces per acre.  The plaintiff alleged that such a low number was chosen “only to
point out the difference from the high dosage” known in the prior art.  Since the
patent applicant lacked the requisite intent to abandon all relatively low dosages, the
plaintiff argued that estoppel did not lie.  Nationwide Chem., 584 F.2d at 718, 200
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 10-11.
292. Nationwide Chem., 584 F.2d at 718, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 260.
293. Id. at 719, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 13.
294. 347 F.2d 453, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 146 (7th Cir. 1965).
295. Id. at 454, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 147.
296. Id., 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 147.
297. Nationwide Chem., 584 F.2d at 719, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 261 (citing Ecko
Prods., 347 F.2d at 455, 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 148) (emphasis added).
298. Id.  Nationwide Chemical and Ekco are the two cases specifically mentioned in
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 481
(Fed. Cir. 1983), as being “rejected” by the Federal Circuit because they applied a
“wooden” rule of estoppel in which “virtually any amendment of the claims creates a
‘file wrapper estoppel’ effective to bar all resort to the doctrine of equivalents, and to
confine patentee ‘strictly to the letter of the limited claims granted.’”  Id. at 1362, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.  The Hughes court found this approach negated “entirely the
doctrine of equivalents and limit[ed] determination of the infringement issue to
consideration of literal infringement alone.”  Id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481
(emphasis in original).
299. See Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 719, 200 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 257, 261 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that the presumption from Hunt Tool, that
the patentee did not make a disclaimer broader than necessary to obtain allowance
of  the claim might apply “where the purported infringer falls on the other side of
the patent in suit from the prior art,” making the patent in suit entitled to some
slight range of equivalents). The Nationwide Chemical court further noted that the
Hunt Tool presumption also might apply where the limitation in the claim was not
inserted to overcome prior art.  Id., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 261.
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seemed to limit Hunt Tool to situations even narrower than the facts
of that case would dictate.300
The Fifth Circuit’s last word on the subject came in Continental Oil
Co. v. Cole.301  The court reversed a lower court’s application of
prosecution history estoppel after citing Hunt Tool’s presumption that
patentees do not intend to abandon any more than necessary to
overcome a rejection.302  The rejection at issue in Continental Oil was
not based on prior art.303  The circuit conflict and confusion was not
resolved prior to the Federal Circuit’s assumption of exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases in 1982.
Courts in other circuits similarly were split on whether prosecution
history estoppel bars resort to the doctrine of equivalents where a
claim has been amended in response to a prior art rejection, such as
in Exhibit Supply, or only where the relevant limitation added by the
amendment was necessary to overcome the examiner’s rejection,
such as in Hunt Tool.
The Seventh Circuit continued to apply prosecution history
estoppel to bar resort to the doctrine of equivalents in all cases in
which a claim was amended in response to a prior art rejection.  The
Second and Fourth Circuits followed the Seventh’s Circuit’s lead—
and the Nationwide Chemical side of the intra-Fifth Circuit split—when
the issue finally arose in those courts.304  However, the First Circuit, in
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, Inc.,305 joined with the Hunt
Tool court in rejecting the per se rule of prosecution history estoppel
set forth in Exhibit Supply, and instead adopted a factual inquiry that
                                                          
300. See Nationwide Chem., 584 F.2d at 719, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 261 (speculating
that if Nationwide had limited the claim to dosage of 2-4 ounces and the defendant
had used 1 ounce, the Hunt Tool presumption might apply and entitle Nationwide to
a limited range of equivalents below 2 ounces).
301. 634 F.2d 188, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361 (5th Cir. 1981).
302. See id. at 198, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 369-70 (rejecting trial judge’s conclusion
that file wrapper estoppel applied to the case and citing the Hunt Tool presumption
as part of the basis for the rejection).
303. Id. at 195, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 366-67.
304. See, e.g., Cohn v. Coleco Indus., 558 F.2d 53, 58, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 241, 244
(2d Cir. 1976) (citing Exhibit Supply and holding that when the patentee, in order to
meet objections in the Patent Office, based on references to prior art, narrows the
claim and emphasizes the difference between the broad and the amended claim, the
patentee abandons all that is embraced by the difference); Power Curbers, Inc. v.
E.D. Etnyre & Co., 298 F.2d 484, 494-95, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158, 166-67 (4th Cir.
1962) (“Where the patentee in the course of his application in the patent office has,
by amendment, cancelled or surrendered claims, those which are allowed are to be
read in the light of those abandoned and an abandoned claim cannot be revived and
restored to the patent by reading it by construction into the claims which are
allowed.”) (quoting Schriber Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217-18, 47
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 345, 348 (1940)).
305. 355 F.2d 400, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1st Cir. 1965).
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considered not only what literal claim scope was relinquished by
amendment, but why it was relinquished.  The court held that
estoppel did not apply because the part of the amendment that
relinquished coverage of the accused device addressed the
indefiniteness rejection rather than the prior art rejection.306  The
court stated that inquiry into the reasons for amendment is
required.307
In Omark Industries, Inc. v. Textron,308 the Ninth Circuit also
employed the more flexible approach.  The defendant raised
prosecution history estoppel as a defense because the relevant
claim—for a chainsaw chain—had been amended during prosecution
to include a specific limitation on the device.309  In rejecting this
argument, the court held that the assignee of the patent was not
“recapturing something it had given up to secure the issuance of the
patent.”310  Following the Nationwide Chemical holding, the court
reasoned that “[a]n applicant should not be presumed to have made
a disclaimer broader than necessary to yield to the actual challenge of
the claim.”311
Of particular importance to the development of the jurisprudence
in this area is the view of the United States Court of Claims
articulated prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit.312  The
United States Court of Claims sided with the circuits that adopted the
flexible approach.  In Garrett Corp. v. United States,313 the patentee
narrowed claims for a life raft ramp that would remain “at water
level” when the raft was boarded.314  This limitation was inserted to
avoid a prior art reference that showed a ramp that was entirely
submerged when boarded.315  The accused raft contained a ramp that
became slightly submerged when boarded.  The court rejected the
                                                          
306. See id. at 405-07, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 6-7 (rejecting application of the
doctrine of file wrapper estoppel).
307. Id. at 406, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 6.
308. 688 F.2d 1242, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 749 (9th Cir. 1982).
309. See id. at 1251-52, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 757 (referring to the district court’s
finding that the limitation requiring that “the pivot point be located at the most
rearward part of the base of the cutter was unnecessary to distinguish the claim over
the prior art cited.”).
310. Id., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 757.
311. Id. at 1252, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 757 (quoting Ziegler, 483 F.2d at 871, 177
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 489, and Nationwide Chem., 584 F.2d at 719-20, 200 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 261).
312. In the Federal Circuit’s first published decision, the court adopted as binding
precedent the decisions of its two predecessor courts:  the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.  South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368,
1370-71, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 657, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
313. 422 F.2d 874, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
314. Id. at 882, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 527.
315. Id., 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 527.
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estoppel defense because the accused product was closer to the
patent claims than was the prior art that was distinguished.316  While
acknowledging Exhibit Supply, the court relied on the presumption
stated in Hunt Tool that a patentee making an amendment should not
be presumed to have intended to limit the claim any more than
necessary to avoid the prior art.317
VIII.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SETTLES THE ISSUE ON THE SIDE
OF THE PATENT HOLDER:  HUGHES AIRCRAFT V. UNITED STATES
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982318 to promote “doctrinal
stability” and to “reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and
uncertainty of legal doctrine” that then existed in the patent law.319
In one of its first major patent law decisions—Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States320—the Federal Circuit grappled with the question that
had divided the circuit courts, and that had been the subject of
changing views in the Supreme Court:  the role of prosecution history
estoppel and its relation to the doctrine of equivalents.
Hughes involved a patent filed by Donald Williams in 1960 for a
control system used on early communications satellites to keep the
satellite stable in orbit.  Hughes’ satellites used a ground-based
mechanical device to control the satellite’s orientation.321 By the time
the first accused Government satellites were deployed in the early
1970s, computer technology had progressed to the point where the
ground-based mechanical device was no longer necessary.  Instead,
using the same methodology employed by Hughes, the accused
satellites used on-board computer processors to execute an
orientation correction maneuver.322  Hughes asserted infringement
                                                          
316. Id., 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 527.
317. Id., 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 527 (citing Hunt Tool, 242 F.2d at 354, 113
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 13).
318. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-154, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A.) (establishing both United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States Claims Court).
319. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573-74,
223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 465, 470 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting legislative history of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act).
320. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
321. See Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1352-57, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 474-77 (detailing
much of the technical background).  Hughes had invented a system in which a
satellite detected its orientation relative to the sun and the earth.  The satellite’s
orientation, and the extent of its angular rotation, were transmitted to earth, where
ground controllers used a mechanical device synchronized with the satellite to
calculate when to send a command to the satellite to correct its orientation.  Id.
322. Rather than use a mechanical device, the Government spacecraft used a
computer processor on-board the satellite to generate the jet pulse firing command
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under the doctrine of equivalents.323
The Federal Circuit began its discussion of the doctrine by
referring to the Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.324  Graver Tank raised, for
the first time since Winans a century earlier, the fundamental
question of whether the doctrine of equivalents should exist.  In
Graver Tank, the majority of the Justices acknowledged that, “[i]n
determining whether an accused device or composition infringes a
valid patent, resort must be had in the first instance to the words of
the claim.  If accused matter falls clearly within the claim,
infringement is made out and that is the end of it.”325  But, the Court
continued, it had also been recognized that “to permit imitation of a
patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be
to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and
useless thing.”326  The Court noted that literal duplication of an
invention was a rare occurrence, and that a rule permitting slight
alterations—in the words of the Court, “unimportant and
insubstantial changes”—would encourage “unscrupulous copyists” to
“introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy.”327  A
rule permitting such conduct “would place the inventor at the mercy
of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form.  It would
deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would foster
concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the
primary purposes of the patent system.”328  The Court in Graver Tank
continued:
The doctrine of equivalents evolved in response to this experience.
The essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on
a patent.  Originating almost a century ago in the case of Winans v.
Denmead, it has been consistently applied by this Court and the
lower federal courts, and continues today ready and available for
utilization when the proper circumstances for its application arise.
'To temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing
                                                          
to correct the spacecraft’s orientation.  See generally Syncom—The World’ First
Geosynchronous Communications Satellite, Boeing Satellite Systems, Inc. (providing an
overview of the history and technology of Hughes’ Syncom satellite system), available
at http://www.hsc.com/factsheets/ 376/syncom/syncom.html (last visited May 20,
2002); David J. Wahlen, Communications Satellites: Making the Global Village Possible,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (discussing the history of
communication satellites), available at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/
satcomhistory (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
323. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1361, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 480.
324. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
325. Id. at 607.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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the benefit of the invention,' a patentee may invoke this doctrine to
proceed against the producer of a device 'if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result.'  The theory on which it is founded is that
'if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and
accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even
though they differ in name, form or shape.'329
Picking up on these themes, the Federal Circuit in Hughes noted
that the doctrine of equivalents was “judicially devised to do equity”
and that the “essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a
fraud on a patent.”330  Hughes Aircraft’s claims had been amended in
response to a rejection over the prior art—the McLean spacecraft—
which was a concept for a self-guided space vehicle that would home
to a distant target such as a star but could not be controlled from the
ground.331  Thus, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that “[h]aving
chosen specific words of limitation to avoid the McLean disclosure,
Hughes is estopped . . . from obtaining a claim interpretation so
broad as to encompass the McLean structure . . . .”332  The court
found that the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel precluded a
patent owner from constructing a claim based upon subject matter
that was surrendered in arguments submitted to obtain the patent.333
                                                          
329. Id., 339 U.S. at 608 (citations omitted).  Like Winans, the Court’s strong
adherence to a doctrine of equivalents was not without dissent.  Echoing the
concerns of the dissenters one hundred years before, Justice Black, joined by
Justice Douglas (the author of the Exhibit Supply opinion), voiced the same
concern about a lack of certainty:
The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of
making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to
the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner
different from the plain import of its terms.  Giving this patentee the benefit
of a grant that it did not precisely claim is no less unjust to the public and no
less an evasion of [the patent statute requiring particular and distinct
claiming] merely because done in the name of the ‘doctrine of equivalents.’
* * * *  The Court’s ruling today sets the stage for more patent ‘fraud’ and
‘piracy’ against business than could be expected from faithful observance of
the congressionally enacted plan to protect business against judicial
expansion of precise patent claims.  Hereafter a manufacturer cannot rely
on what the language of a patent claims. He must be able, at the peril of
heavy infringement damages, to forecast how far a court relatively unversed
in a particular technological field will expand the claim's language after
considering the testimony of technical experts in that field.  To burden
business enterprise on the assumption that men possess such a prescience
bodes ill for the kind of competitive economy that is our professed goal.
Id. at 614, 617 (Black, J., dissenting).
330. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1361, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 480.
331. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1354-56, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 475-76 .
332. Id. at 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.
333. See id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481 (rejecting the view expressed by some
courts that the doctrine of “file wrapper estoppel” bars all future claims that might by
made under the doctrine of equivalents as failing to recognized that the doctrine of
equivalents is unnecessary when literal infringement is present and as contrary to
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But the real question for the court was the scope of that estoppel.334
In addressing this question, the court commented that the Williams
patent did not surrender subject matter related to employment of an
on-board computer to accomplish in a similar manner what was
accomplished by the disclosed structure.335  An applicant for a patent
must only designate the best method known for executing the
invention and not “to predict all future developments which enable
the practice of [the] invention in substantially the same way.”336
The court went on to note that amending claims is common-place
in the prosecution of patents and that those amendments may be of
differing types and functions, resulting in a wide range of limiting
effects, which may or may not be fatal to application of the doctrine
of equivalents.337  The court stated that “a patent that has been
severely limited to avoid the prior art will only have a small range
between it and the point beyond which it violates file wrapper
estoppel.”338  However, Hughes did not concern such a patent.339
The McLean spacecraft reference distinguished during the
prosecution was a demonstrably different device; one that was not
controlled from the ground.340  This, the court stated, was “an
important consideration in applying the doctrine of equivalents.”341
Because the accused Government satellites were much closer to
Hughes’ patent than they were to the prior art McLean spacecraft,
the court held that application of the doctrine of equivalents would
not violate the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.342  For nearly
                                                          
Graver).
334. See generally Glen K. Beaton, File Wrapper Estoppel and the Federal Circuit, 68
DENV. U. L. REV. 283 (1991) (reviewing, in general, prosecution history estoppel);
Paul J. Otterstedt, Unwrapping File Wrapper Estoppel in the Federal Circuit:  A New
Economic Policy Approach, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 405 (1993) (discussing three types of
prosecution history estoppel—classical estoppel, estoppel by admission and non-art
estoppel).
335. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.
336. Id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.
337. Id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.
338. Id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481 (citing Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d
391, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
339. See id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481 (disagreeing with the plaintiff that
Williams submitted a claim which broadly covered all ground controllable spacecraft,
but finding that the amendments made to Williams’ patent did not take into account
such differences as ground control versus non-ground control as a result of being
privy to prior art).
340. See Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1360-61, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 480 (explaining that
the McLean spacecraft, unlike the Williams satellite, could not receive commands
from the ground).
341. Id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 482.
342. See id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 484 (explaining that the accused spacecraft
and the Hughes satellite reflect the precise circumstance envisaged in Graver since
they perform the same function—receipt of and response to command signals—in
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twenty years thereafter, the Federal Circuit adhered to the view in
Hughes that courts should undertake a case-specific analysis of the
prosecution history of the patent-in-suit to determine whether, on a
particular set of facts, application of the doctrine of equivalents
would run afoul of prosecution history estoppel.343
IX. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT UNSETTLES THE ISSUE IN FESTO
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.344 represented a sea of change in the Federal
Circuit’s approach to balancing the interests of the patentee and his
would-be competitors.345  The court, sitting en banc, overruled the
case-by-case approach adopted in Hughes and adopted a rigid rule
imposing prosecution history estoppel for any amended claim
element.346
Three years prior to Festo, in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co.,347 the first case to address the doctrine of equivalents
                                                          
substantially the same way—synchronized jet firing—thereby obtaining the same
result—controlled positioning, and thus  both resemble one another more closely
than the McLean spacecraft).
343. See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell Corp., 140 F.3d 1449, 1456, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (adhering to the holding and
language in Hughes in that “an amendment to claim language in response to prior art
may have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small to zero.
The effect may or may not be fatal to application of a range of equivalents broad
enough to encompass a particular accused product.  It is not fatal to application of
the doctrine itself.”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (refusing to invoke
estoppel “given the marked differences between the reference and the patented and
accused devices.”); Hormone Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558,
1564, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that “whenever a
limiting amendment or argument is made during prosecution, the patentee loses all
coverage between what the claims literally cover and what they would have covered
prior to the amendment or argument.”); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. ITC, 867 F.2d 1572,
1576, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1995, 1999 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (remanding case for close
analysis of prosecution history and noting similarities to Hughes where the
“government spacecraft [were] much closer to patentee’s satellite than to prior art
space vehicle.”); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 938 n.2, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1737 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (ruling that because a
patent applicant narrows his claims in amending to secure approval, prosecution
history estoppel does not always prohibit the patentee from recapturing some of the
subject matter rights originally claimed—the amount of coverage retained depends
on the circumstances of each case); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 613-15, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1908-10 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Michel, J., dissenting) (listing over 90 Federal Circuit cases that applied the
Hughes case-by-case approach).
344. 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
345. See generally Belvis, supra note 89 (providing an overview of changes in the
doctrine of equivalents post-Festo); Anthony H. Azure, Note, Festo Effect on After-Arising
Technology and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2001) (giving an
overview of Festo and what changes the decision brought).
346. Festo, 234 F.3d at 569, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
347. 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
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after Graver Tank,348 the Supreme Court had unanimously reaffirmed
the doctrine’s viability.349  The Warner-Jenkinson Court addressed the
concern first expressed in Winans that the doctrine of equivalents
should not be applied too broadly and noted that this concern was
mollified by the “all-elements rule.”   Each element of a patent claim
is material in defining the scope of the patented invention.350  The
“all elements rule” had been defined in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence more than a century before.351
The Warner-Jenkinson decision thus obliged courts to inquire as to
whether “the accused product or process contain[s] elements
identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented
invention?”352  “[T]he substantial equivalent of a thing, in the sense of
the patent law, is the same as the thing itself.”353  Indeed, “the
essential predicate of the doctrine of equivalents is the notion of
identity between a patented invention and its equivalent.”354
The Warner-Jenkinson Court also clarified the role of prosecution
history estoppel.355  Prosecution history estoppel, the Court
concluded, may limit the doctrine of equivalents in circumstances
where the patent claim was amended during the application process,
depending on the reasons for the amendment and the purpose for
which it was added.356  But importantly, the Court rejected the
position that “any surrender of subject matter during patent
prosecution, regardless of the reason for such surrender, precludes
recapturing any part of that subject matter, even if it is equivalent to
the matter expressly claimed.”357  The Court observed that the reason
for amending a claim during patent prosecution was central to
deciding whether a patent holder should be estopped from asserting
the doctrine of equivalents in any given case.358
                                                          
348. See Belvis, supra note 89, at 62-63 (discussing the evolution of the doctrine of
equivalents from Graver Tank to Warner-Jenkinson).
349. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 17-18 (adhering to the doctrine of
equivalents and stating that the holding of Graver Tank has not become irrelevant
following the revisions of the United States Patent Act).
350. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29-30 (stating that the doctrine of equivalents
must be applied individually to elements of a patent claim).
351. See supra Part III (discussing the history of the all elements rule).
352. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40 .
353. Id. at 35 (quoting Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1878)).
354. Id.
355. See id. at 30 (confirming that the well-established doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel remains intact as a limitation on the doctrine of equivalent, even
after Graver Tank).
356. Id. at 30-34.
357. Id. at 30.
358. Id. at 31-32.
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Commenting on the more than one hundred years of precedent
reviewed ante, the Warner-Jenkinson Court noted:  “It is telling that in
each case this Court probed the reasoning behind the Patent Office’s
insistence upon a change in the claims.  In each instance, a change
was demanded because the claim as otherwise written was viewed as
not describing a patentable invention at all—typically because what it
described was encompassed within the prior art.”359  Thus, rather than
adopt a “rigid rule invoking an estoppel regardless of the reasons for
a change,”360 the Court held instead that “[w]here the reason for the
change was not related to avoiding the prior art, the change may
introduce a new element, but it does not necessarily preclude
infringement by equivalents of that element.”361  To decide whether
an estoppel applies, a court should therefore “explore . . . the reason
(right or wrong) for the objection and the manner in which the
amendment addressed and avoided the objection.”362  Where the
reason for an amendment is not established, however, the Court
ruled that it would “presume that the patent applicant had a
‘substantial reason related to patentability’ for including the limiting
element added by amendment.  In those circumstances, prosecution
history estoppel would bar the application of the doctrine of
equivalents as to that element.”363
The Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson thus validated the balance
between the interests of the patent owner and his would-be
competitors that the Federal Circuit had consistently implemented
since Hughes.  The Federal Circuit in Festo, however, reversed course,
and skewed the balance well to the side of would-be competitors and
against patent owners.
The Festo decision began by asking and answering a series of policy
questions posed sua sponte by the en banc court.364  The first question
asked whether the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson intended, by
referring to a presumption of estoppel where an amendment was
prompted by a “substantial reason related to patentability,” to refer
only to reasons relating to a prior art rejection.365  Virtually every
Supreme Court case had decided the issue of prosecution history
                                                          
359. Id. at 31.
360. Id. at 32.
361. Id. at 33.
362. Id. at 33 n.7.
363. Id. at 33.
364. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (outlining five questions that
related to the doctrine of equivalents in light of Warner-Jenkinson).
365. Id. at 556, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
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estoppel in the context of objections by the Patent Office based on
prior art.366  However, the Festo court held that an amendment
relating to any statutory requirement for patentability, even if
unrelated to prior art, would trigger prosecution history estoppel.367
Because virtually every amendment to a patent claim can be
characterized as related to some legal requirement for obtaining a
patent, the Federal Circuit’s decision guaranteed that virtually any
amendment would trigger an estoppel.368
The second question asked whether a “voluntary” claim
amendment not made in response to any objection by the Patent
Office could trigger an estoppel.369  The court answered
affirmatively.370  The third question asked whether, if a claim
amendment creates an estoppel, there is any range of equivalents
available to the patent holder for the amended claim element.371  The
court answered negatively.372  The court concluded, instead, that the
estoppel acts as a “complete bar” to application of the doctrine of
equivalents to that element.373  Although this question split the court
8 to 4, the en banc majority decided that when prosecution history
estoppel applies, it operates as a “complete bar” to the doctrine of
equivalents.374  The majority stated that in the years after Hughes, the
“notice function” of patent claims had become “paramount.”375  Thus,
                                                          
366. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 31.
367. Festo, 234 F.3d at 567, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
368. The only caveat the Federal Circuit put on this requirement was that the
amendment “narrow” the scope of the claim in some respect.  Id., 234 F.3d at 566.
369. Id. at 568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
370. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
371. Id. at 569, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
372. See id. at 575, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877 (stating a complete bar would
establish a more “workable” doctrine).
373. Id. at 576, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
374. Festo, 234 F.3d at 574-75, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
375. See id. at 575, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d  (BNA) at 1877 (echoing the concerns raised by
the dissenters in Winans nearly a century and half before, the Federal Circuit had,
with increasing frequency in the years leading up to Festo, emphasized this “notice
function” of patent claims - the “public’s” (i.e., competitors’) entitlement to rely on
the words of the claims to determine their respective rights).  See, e.g., Dolly, Inc. v.
Spalding & Evenflo Cos., Inc., 16 F.3d 394, 398, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1771
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The claims—i.e. the scope of patent protection as defined by the
claims—remain the same and application of the doctrine expands the right to
exclude to ‘equivalents’ of what is claimed.  The doctrine of equivalents is not a
license to ignore claim limitations.”) (internal citations omitted). Charles Greiner &
Co., Inc. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526,
1531 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Most important, however, a court must, in applying the
doctrine, avoid significant conflict with the fundamental principle that claims define
the limits of patent protection.  This court has repeatedly stated that the doctrine
must not clash with the legal significance of claims: . . . .”) (internal citations and
quotation omitted); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is . . . well settled that each
element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order for a court to find
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the court reasoned, it was necessary to impose a rule that
“promot[es] certainty in patent law,” an objective that could not be
achieved with the flexible approach of Hughes.376  Additional policy
considerations justified its result, the majority said, because the
complete bar approach would ensure technological advances that
otherwise might have been abandoned “due to fear of litigation.”377
The majority opinion drew several sharp dissents.  Most notably,
the dissenters observed that:
Unwittingly, the majority has severely limited the protection
previously available to patentees.  Indeed, it may nullify the doctrine
of equivalents.  Under the majority’s approach, anyone who wants to
steal a patentee’s technology need only review the prosecution
history to identify patentability-related amendments, and then make
a trivial modification to that part of its product corresponding to an
amended claim limitation. . . [M]ost patentees will lose the
protection against copying that the Supreme Court unanimously
reaffirmed in Warner-Jenkinson.378
One dissent noted that the decision “unfairly tips the balance away
from patentees and toward competitors by constraining the
legitimate rights of patentees to their inventions, even where
competitors can reasonably determine the reasons for any
amendments and the scope of any subject matter surrendered.”379
Another dissent attacked the majority’s economic rationale,
suggesting that although the majority believed the decision would
have a positive impact on the development of new technologies,
“[e]mpirical studies have added rigor to the common sense
knowledge that reduced profit opportunity affects the supply of
capital to launch a new technology, and often the creation of the
technology itself.”380
It is no overstatement to say that the Federal Circuit’s fidelity in
Festo to the historical precedents in this area became a matter of some
controversy.381  The imposition of the “absolute bar” to equivalents for
claims amended for reasons related to patentability appeared to
                                                          
infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its substantial
equivalent in the accused device.”) (quoting Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d
1538, 1551, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
376. Id. at 575, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
377. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
378. Id. at 601, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896 (Michel, J., dissenting).
379. Id. at 620, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (Linn, J., dissenting).
380. Id. at 641, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (Pauline & Newman, JJ., dissenting).
381. See generally Marc S. Hanish & Adrienne Yeung, Patent Practitioners Beware: The
Federal Circuit Release a Manifesto, 9 NEV. LAW. 18, 21 (2001) (criticizing the bright-line
rule created in the Festo decision which will place an increased burden on patent
prosecutions); Belvis, supra note 89.
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contradict directly the Supreme Court’s rejection of such a rigid
approach in Warner-Jenkinson.  By focusing on the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel as a vehicle to “rein in” the doctrine of
equivalents,382 the Federal Circuit seemingly ignored Warner-
Jenkinson’s intention to address the concern over the perceived
uncertainty created by the doctrine of equivalents by an entirely
different mechanism.  The Warner-Jenkinson Court intended that this
issue be addressed in a much more nuanced way than the blunt
instrument of an “absolute bar.”  Instead, the Court cautioned the
lower courts to apply the doctrine of equivalents so as not to “vitiate
the central functions of the patent claims themselves.”  In this way,
courts could “ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to
an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively
eliminate that element in its entirety.”383 In other words, faithful
application of the “all-elements-rule,” which traces its roots back at
least to Union Water-Meter Co. v. Desper,384 is the safeguard against the
uncertainty inherent in any application of the doctrine of
equivalents.  This solution is quite different from the one imposed by
the Federal Circuit, which widened the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel in Festo to such a degree that it virtually swallowed the
doctrine of equivalents.385
Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s elevation of the “notice function” of
patent claims and the “disclaimer” effect of claim amendments to
“paramount” status such that it trumps any consideration of a fair
scope of equivalents ran contrary to the majority view throughout
most of the history of the doctrine of equivalents, with perhaps the
exception of the Depression and some of the ensuing post-World War
II era circuit court cases when the courts were gripped with
anti-patent thinking.  The Federal Circuit’s resolution also seemed in
tension with the intentions expressed by the Nation’s Founders, and
echoed in Supreme Court pronouncements, that the “ultimate goal
of the patent system” is to foster innovation and thereby “bring new
designs and technologies into the public domain through
disclosure.”386  Moreover, from an economic viewpoint, the Federal
Circuit’s imposition of an absolute bar to the doctrine of equivalents
                                                          
382. Festo, 234 F.3d at 578, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
383. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29-30.
384. 101 U.S. 332, 333 (1879).
385. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 598, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896 (Michel, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that with the application of the complete bar standard, the
protection that was offered under the doctrine of equivalents for patent holders is
gone).
386. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
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for most patent claims (since most are amended during prosecution),
favored minor, insubstantial changes in technology that require little
investment, over bold, innovative improvements that require larger
investments.  In fact, the majority’s laudable goal of encouraging
competitors to design around patents seems better served by allowing
the “zone of uncertainty” around the literal scope of patent claims to
belong to the patentee, thus giving the patentee an incentive to more
fully develop the technology, while at the same time inducing
competitors to give patent claims wider berth and thereby create truly
innovative technological improvements.
X. CONCLUSION:  THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN AGAIN
On May 28, 2002, the Supreme Court issued its decision vacating
the Federal Circuit’s decision.387 Interest in these fundamental
questions of patent law raised by the Festo decision had been intense.
In addition to the briefs filed by the parties, over forty amici curiae
either filed or joined in briefs discussing the merits of the case.  The
vast majority of those briefs—including briefs filed by the Solicitor
General of the United States,388 a large number of prominent
companies,389 and some of the most prestigious research universities
in the country390—all argued against affirmation of the Festo decision.
The Supreme Court agreed.  Drawing from themes that re-appear
throughout the history of the case law, the Court restored the
balance between the interests of the patent holder and his
competitors.  The Supreme Court began its opinion by reaffirming
that patents were indeed intended to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts by creating a property right in an invention.391
                                                          
387. 122 S. Ct. at 1831.
388. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and
Remand in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558
(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (U.S. June 18, 2001) (No. 00-1543).
389. Brief of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.; Eli Lilly and Co.; Henkel
Corp.; Johnson & Johnson; Pfizer Inc.; PPG Industries, Inc.; Rexam Beverage Can
Co.; Sun Microsystems, Inc.; and Verizon Communications Inc. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Col, Ltd,
234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (U.S. June 18, 2001) (No.
00-1543).
390. Brief of Amici Curiae Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation; State University of New York-Stony Brook, Office of
Technology Licensing and Industrial Relations; and University of Texas, Medical
Branch at Galveston and M.D. Anderson Cancer Center Houston in Support of
Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (U.S. June 18,
2001) (No. 00-1543).
391. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. _, 122 S.
Ct. 1831, 1836 (May 28, 2002) (No. 00-1543).
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The boundaries of that property right should be clear, however, so
that a patent holder may know what he owns and the public may
know what he does not.392  The nature of the language, unfortunately,
makes it impossible to describe with complete precision the novelty
in an invention.  The Court noted that “if patents were always
interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly
diminished” because “unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for
certain elements could defeat the patent.”393 Thus, the Court noted,
the previous cases that had considered the issue over a century and a
half, from Winans in 1854 to Graver Tank in 1950 to Warner-Jenkinson
in 1997, had invariably decided that some uncertainty in the scope of
patent rights must be tolerated in order to ensure the appropriate
incentive for innovation.394
The Court went on to note that the scope of patent claims must be
determined in light of the prosecution history in the PTO.395 The
Court explained that the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel
constrains the doctrine of equivalents to its original purpose.396
Consistent with the holdings in its prior cases ranging from Goodyear397
to Exhibit Supply,398 the Court explained that a patentee may not
recapture, by asserting equivalency, something that was relinquished
during prosecution.399 Because the doctrine of equivalents is
premised on the inability of language to capture the complete
essence of the innovation, the doctrine of equivalents should not
apply where the inventor was able to describe his invention in a
broader claim that was rejected by the PTO and replaced with a
narrower amended claim.400 In that instance, the prosecution history
indicates that the inventor “knew the words for both the broader and
narrower claim, and affirmatively chose the latter.”401
Turning to the specific questions raised by the petition, the Court
first ruled that any amendment may give rise to a prosecution history
estoppel, even an amendment directed strictly to matters of form in
compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, which governs the form of patent
claims.402  The Supreme Court here agreed with the Federal Circuit
                                                          
392. Id.
393. Id. at 1837.
394. Id. at 1837-39.
395. Id. at 1839-41.
396. Id.
397. See supra note 15.
398. See supra note 250.
399. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1839-40.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 1840.
402. Here, the Court conceded that none of it prior cases had applied
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that estoppel will arise whenever an amendment narrows the claim in
some respect.403 Only amendments that are “truly cosmetic” will not
invoke an estoppel because such amendments do not narrow the
claim in any way.404
The Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s determination that the
estoppel completely bars any assertion of equivalents, however,
because the Federal Circuit’s “per se” rule “is inconsistent with the
purpose of applying the estoppel in the first place—to hold the
inventor to the representations made during the application process
and to the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the
amendment.”405 The Supreme Court explained that by narrowing the
claim, the inventor has conceded that the patent does not extend as
far as the original claim, but no reason exists to presume that “the
amended claim becomes so perfect in its description that no one
could devise an equivalent.”406  The Court continued:
There is no reason why a narrowing amendment should be
deemed to relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the
amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of what was
surrendered.  Nor is there any call to foreclose claims of
equivalence for aspects of the invention that have only a peripheral
relation to the reason the amendment was submitted.407
In order to balance the competing concerns of promoting
innovation and minimizing uncertainty, the Court built upon its
prior decision in Warner-Jenkinson.  That decision had erected a
rebuttable presumption that where no explanation of the rationale
for an amendment appears in the prosecution record, the courts
should presume that the amendment was made to obtain the patent
and therefore estoppel should apply.408  In Festo, the Supreme Court
extended this reasoning.  Because the patentee is expected to draft
claims encompassing “readily known” equivalents, an election to
narrow a claim gives rise to the additional presumption that the
patentee intended to disclaim “the territory between the original
                                                          
prosecution history estoppel in a situation where an amendment was made purely to
improve the form of the claims.  Id. at 1841-42.  All of the prior Supreme Court cases
that had applied prosecution history estoppel had done so where the amendment to
the claim was made in response to prior art, with the exception of Crawford v.
Heysinger, where the amendment was made in response to the Patent Office’s
rejection for claiming an inoperative device.  See supra note 164; supra Parts II-VI.
403. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841-43.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1843-44.
406. Id. at 1844.
407. Id.
408. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
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claim and the amended claim.”409  The patentee bears the burden of
rebutting that presumption by establishing a reason why the
amendment should not be viewed as surrendering a particular
equivalent.410  For example, the asserted equivalent might not have
been foreseeable at the time of the application, the rationale for the
amendment might be no more than tangentially related to the
asserted equivalent, or there may exist some other reason suggesting
that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described
the equivalent in question.  “In those cases the patentee can
overcome the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a
finding of equivalence.”411
It is now for the Federal District Courts and the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit to faithfully apply the Supreme Court’s
guidance.  How the Federal Circuit applies the new Festo
presumption, and in particular under what circumstances it will find
it rebutted, will have a large impact on whether the balance between
patentee and competitor is truly maintained.  Some ambiguities exist
in the Supreme Court opinion that could make this task more
difficult.
For example, it remains to be seen how the Federal Circuit
understands and applies the Supreme Court’s premise that estoppel
should apply “[w]hen . . . the patentee originally claimed the subject
matter alleged to infringe but then narrowed the claim in response to
a rejection.”412  Under the somewhat arcane rules of patent claiming,
of which the Supreme Court may not have been aware, the patentee’s
originally submitted claim might literally cover an unknowable
equivalent simply by virtue of the fact that it used open-ended
“comprising” language.  For example, the original claim may have
been to a device comprising elements A, B and C.  An amendment
might have added element D, thereby “narrowing” the claim.
Suppose the amended claim is thereafter asserted against a device
comprising A,B,C and D’, where D’ is an equivalent of D that may
have been unknowable at the time of the amendment.  The original
claim (A,B,C) would “literally” have encompassed A,B,C and D’.  But
the Supreme Court could not have meant that the doctrine of
equivalents is necessarily eliminated in that situation. The Supreme
                                                          
409. Festo, 122 S.Ct. at 1846.
410. Id. at 1846-47.
411. Id. at 1847.
412. Id. at 1839.  The Supreme Court also stated:  “The patentee must show that at
the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected
to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged
equivalent.”  Id. at 1847.
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Court’s statement appears to be limited to the situation where the
patentee originally attempted to claim a particular feature of his
invention, and later narrowed the claim element relating to that
feature.  The Court does not appear to have intended the statement
to apply where the patentee did not originally intend to limit his
claim to the feature.  Were it otherwise, the Court’s statements that
the presumption of estoppel can be rebutted where the equivalent is
unforeseeable would be meaningless.
Other questions exist, such as what the Court meant when it said
that the presumption could be overcome where “the rationale
underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential
relation to the equivalent in question.”413  Presumably, one situation
that would qualify under this exception is the common practice of re-
writing dependent claims into independent form to make them
acceptable to the patent examiner.  For example, the examiner may
indicate that an independent claim with elements A,B,C is not
patentable.  However, a dependent claim, which adds element D
(and thus by definition comprises elements A,B,C and D) may be
allowable if re-written in independent form to contain all four
elements.  Where the patent is later asserted against the combination
of A,B,C and D’, there appears little reason to hold that the patentee
should be estopped from asserting that D and D’ are equivalents
because the rationale for the amendment had “no more than a
tangential relation to the equivalent in question.”414  In addition, it is
not clear what might qualify as “some other reason suggesting that
the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the
insubstantial substitute in question.”415
   The one certainty is that the great majority of patent infringement
disputes will be impacted by the Supreme Court’s Festo decision.  So,
too, will patent prosecution, where patent practitioners now, more
than ever, bear the particular burden of making the rationale for
amendments clear in the record, in order to enable the rebuttal of
the new Festo presumption, should litigation ensue.  With wisdom and
judgment, the Federal Circuit and other courts will apply the new
                                                          
413. Id. at 1847.
414. Id.
415. Id.  For example, in rapidly-developing areas of technology, such as
biotechnology or sub-molecular physics, the particular nomenclature or terminology
used may evolve over time.  It is possible to envision a situation where a particular
term for an element of the invention did not exist at the time of the patent
application or that a term used in the application later evolves so as to have a
different meaning in the art.  Application of estoppel would seem inappropriate in
such a case if literal infringement is avoided by virtue of the changed terminology.
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presumption so as to maintain the historical balance between the
interests of the patentee in the full exploitation of his invention
(including its insubstantial variations) and the interests of his
competitors to design improvements and thereby compete on the
economic playing field.  In both situations, as James Madison aptly
put it:  “The public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of
individuals.”416
                                                          
416. Supra note 2.
